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Toward an Eclectic Approach to
Separation of Powers: Morrison v. Olson
Examined
by KEITH WERHAN*
In its final years, the Burger Court assumed a leading role in resolv-
ing conflicts between the President and Congress.I This role paralleled a
widespread reinvigoration of separation-of-powers principles throughout
public law doctrine.2 Separation-of-powers doctrine has become promi-
nent in the Court's approach to justiciability, particularly standing is-
sues,3 and in administrative law, most notably with respect to judicial
review of agency action.4 Across considerable doctrinal terrain, the
Court has identified separation-of-powers principles as the basis for de-
lineating rules of decision.
In retrospect, the Court's role as primary arbiter of separation prin-
ciples may have been forced on it by the misadventures of the Nixon
* Professor of Law, Tulane Law School; B.B.A., Notre Dame, 1972; J.D., George
Washington University National Law Center, 1975. The author would like to thank Dean
Alfange, Jr., Michael Collins, David Gelfand, John Stick, and the participants in a work-in-
progress seminar the author presented at Tulane Law School for their thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article. The author began work on this article while a member of the
faculty of Western New England College School of Law, and wishes to express appreciation to
that institution for providing a research stipend that contributed to the completion of this
Article.
I. This phenomenon has been widely noted. 'See, e.g., Braveman, Chadha: The Supreme
Court as Umpire in Separation of Powers Disputes, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 735, 740-44 (1984);
Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 19, 20; Strauss, Formal
and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489-90 (1987).
2. See Braveman, supra note 1, at 740-44.
3. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983). The Court's
linkage of standing doctrine with the separation of powers has been challenged. See Allen, 468
U.S. at 789-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v.
Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 642-49 (1985).
4. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865-66 (1984). For varying views on Chevron, see Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath:
Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301
(1988); Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986); Sun-
stein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 464-69 (1987).
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administration, most notably the constitutional conflict resulting from
the efforts of a special prosecutor to gain access to the White House tapes
relating to Watergate.5 Before the Nixon tapes litigation, to observe that
Supreme Court decisions touching on separation of powers were spo-
radic, idiosyncratic, and devoid of precedential guidance was a constitu-
tional clich. 6 This languor disappeared in the years following the Nixon
tapes decision, and the Supreme Court has decided an accelerating suc-
cession of separation cases.7
Although the Court has tried to develop a broad doctrine on this
issue, its increased activity has left separation-of-powers thinking in a
muddle. The Court's opinions, beginning with the Nixon tapes case,
have been difficult to reconcile in any principled fashion.' In a series of
increasingly formalistic opinions, the Court has struck down as en-
croachments on executive prerogative congressional enactments such as
legislative vetoes and innovative budget-setting processes.9 At the same
time, the Court has employed a more functional analysis to sustain con-
gressional programs that arguably infringed the judicial power of the fed-
eral courts.' Confusion has persisted not only on a doctrinal level,,but
also on the levels of methodology and theory.
In this context the Court decided Morrison v. Olson." In Olson, the
5. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nixon 1); Mishkin, Great Cases and
Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 76, 76-80 (1974); infra
notes 19-32 and accompanying text. The tapes litigation was merely one among many, con-
flicts resulting from President Nixon's vigorous assertions of executive power. See A. SCIJLES-
INGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY viii passim (1973); Quint, The Separation of Powers
Under Nixon: Reflections on Constitutional Limits and the Rule of Law, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1.
6. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring); Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers: An Essay on the Vitality of a
Constitutional Idea, 52 OR. L. REV. 211, 231 (1973); Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Pow-
ers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 385-86 (1976). Justice Jackson attributed the failure ofprecedent
to "the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way." Youngs-
town, 343 U.S. at 635.
7. See infra notes 33-113 and accompanying text. Professor Freund predicted, but did
not endorse, this increased reliance on the courts to resolve disputes between Congress and the
Executive after Nixon L See Freund, Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, The Supreme Court,
1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 37-39 (1974).
8. See Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court's
Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1083-88, 1097-99
(1987); Strauss, supra note 1, at 488-89.
9. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (budget process); see also INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legislative veto); infra notes 52-74 and accompanying text. See infra note
64 and accompanying text for the sense in which the author uses "formalistic" in this Article.
10. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); infra notes
75-113 and accompanying text. See infra notes 208-212 and accompanying text for a descrip-
tion of a functional approach to separation of powers.
11. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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Court upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions
of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (Ethics Act),12 which Congress
passed to institutionalize the "special prosecutor" mechanism that had
triggered the Nixon tapes controversy. 3 The Ethics Act creates a proce-
dure whereby so-called independent counsel, prosecutors who are largely
independent of executive control, investigate and prosecute allegations of
criminal activity made against senior officials of the executive branch.14
Olson gave the Court an opportunity to reassess the constitutional
problems that arose in the Nixon tapes decision in light of its recent ac-
tivism in separation-of-powers cases. More importantly, in Olson the
Court settled some of the uncertainty created by its recent decisions. The
contending positions in Olson, both plausible readings of separation pre-
cedent, posed an interesting problem for the Court. To strike down the
independent counsel mechanism would be to question seriously the un-
derpinning of the Court's prior decision to force President Nixon to re-
linquish his tapes to the special prosecutor. To uphold the statute would
be to renounce the rhetoric of the activist decisions the Nixon tapes case
helped create.
This Article focuses on how the Olson Court resolved this preceden-
tial bind. The Article is concerned less with the substantive outcome of
Olson-whether the Court's decision to uphold the Ethics Act was cor-
rect' 5 -than with the Court's methodology in reaching and justifying
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (1987).
13. See infra notes 114-130 and accompanying text.
14. Congress changed the title of "special prosecutor" to "independent counsel" when it
amended the Ethics Act in 1982. Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-409, § 2, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). The purpose of the title change was to "spare the
subject of [an] investigation adverse public reaction" and to avoid suggesting "that an indict-
ment.., will be brought." S.REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3537, 3554.
15. The substantive question in Olson, whether the independent counsel provisions of the
Ethics Act violate separation-of-powers principles, generated a substantial amount of commen-
tary in anticipation of the Supreme Court's decision. See, Independent Counsel Symposium, 25
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 167 (1987); A Symposium on Special Prosecutions and the Role of the
Independent Counsel, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1987); Banks, When They Get Close to the
Truth: Challenging the Special Prosecutors, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 623 (1987); Bruff, In-
dependent Counsel and the Constitution, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 539 (1988); Levin, In-
dependent Counsel, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 73 (1987); Walsh, The Independent Counsel and the
Separation of Powers, 25 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1988); Note, On the Constitutionality of the In-
dependent Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act: Do They Comport with the
Separation of Powers?, 26 DuQ. L. REV. 715 (1988); Note, Independent Counsels Under the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978: A Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine or an
Essential Check on Executive Power?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 735 (1988). For earlier discus-
sions, see Kramer & Smith, The Special Prosecutor Act: Proposals For 1983, 66 MINN. L. REV.
963 (1982); Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers As Checks on Abuses of Execu-
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that outcome. The Olson decision could signal a healthy development in
separation-of-powers methodology.
This Article sketches the competing lines of precedent on separation
of powers, beginning with the Nixon tapes decision. After an analysis of
the Court's methodology in Olson, the Article compares the Olson deci-
sion with modem precedent, and argues that the Court's decision inte-
grates the competing approaches to separation problems. This Article
contends that the Court's eclectic approach in Olson mediated the choice
between formalism and functionalism in much the same way the Framers
blended the theories of separated powers with checks and balances when
constructing the structure of the national government. The Article chal-
lenges the eclectic approach in Olson as incomplete, specifically challeng-
ing the Court for failing to offer a normative dimension to its analysis in
Olson. The Article concludes that, as the Court moves beyond Olson, the
Justices should offer a normative anchoring for their eclectic approach to
separation-of-powers issues to secure their judgment to the values served
by the structure of government delineated in the Constitution.
I. From "Special Prosecutor" to "Independent Counsel": The
Supreme Court's Struggle to Provide a Coherent
Separation Principle
A. The Early Decisions: Nixon I and Nixon II
In the course of Supreme Court history, opinions elaborating the
separation of powers have been infrequent, but hotly contested. Early in
this century, for example, a challenge to the President's firing of a post-
master produced opinions by two leading Justices that amounted to rival
treatises on the separation of powers, particularly the nature and scope of
executive power. 6 At mid-century, when a divided Court invalidated
the President's seizure of the nation's steel mills to head off a major labor
strike, seven of the nine Justices wrote opinions offering different ap-
proaches to the separation issues presented. "7 The Court's decision in
United States v. Nixon (Nixon 1)1s was unusual in two respects: the
Court's opinion was unanimous, and it began a steady and increasing
flow of separation-of-powers decisions.
In Nixon I, the Court upheld a subpoena issued by a federal district
judge directing the President to produce tapes and documents recording
tive Power, 63 B.U.L. REV. 59 (1983); Tuerkheimer, The Executive Investigates Itself, 65 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 597 (1977).
16. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); id. at 240 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
18. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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conversations between the President and his advisers.19 The subpoena
was issued in connection with the criminal trial of former members of the
White House staff and of the President's re-election campaign staff.2"
The President challenged the subpoena, arguing that his refusal to com-
ply was nonjusticiable2t and that separation of powers barred a court
from reviewing presidential claims of executive privilege.22 The Court
rejected the President's bid for an absolute privilege,23 substituting a
qualified privilege for presidential communications that operates accord-
ing to a balancing mechanism. The Court described the task of balancing
this way: "We must weigh the importance of the general privilege of
confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of his re-
sponsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair adminis-
tration of criminal justice."24 In Nixon I the balanced tipped away, from
the President, who could offer only a "generalized interest in confidenti-
19. Id. at 686.
20. Id. at 687 & n.3. The grand jury's indictment did not charge the President, but
named him as an unindicted coconspirator. Id. at 687.
21. Id. at 692-97. The President argued that the dispute was between the special prosecu-
tor and himself, amounting to an intrabranch matter into which the Court should not intrude.
Id. at 692. The President underscored his argument with the claim: "Since the Executive
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case,
... a President's decision is final in determining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal
case." Id. at 693 (citations omitted). The Court responded to this argument by recasting the
dispute: the subpoena was not simply a disagreement between executive branch officials, but
also was issued in "a judicial proceeding." Id. at 694. Moreover, the special prosecutor was
not a typical subordinate in the executive branch, id. at 696, but instead had been granted
"unique authority and tenure" by a regulation promulgated by the Attorney General, id. at
694. The regulation made the special prosecutor "independent," id. at 697, and explicitly
empowered him to contest claims of executive privilege in the process of gathering evidence for
trial, id. at 694-95. Fundamentally, the Court noted, the President's claim involved "the kind
of controversy courts traditionally resolve"-"the production or nonproduction of specified
evidence deemed by the Special Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in a pending criminal
case." Id. at 696-97.
22. Id. at 703. The President's uncompromising stand had plausible grounding in pre-
Nixon I separation-of-powers thinking. See Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
1383, 1387-91 (1974).
23. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 703-07. Citing the duty derived from Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), "to say what the law is," id. at 703, the Court found that such an
absolute power in the hands of the President would be "contrary to the basic concept of sepa-
ration of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite govern-
ment," id. at 704. The Court explained, "The impediment that an absolute, unqualified
privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to
do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under
Art. III." Id. at 707. To validate an absolute presidential privilege would defeat the constitu-
tional plan for "a workable government." Id.
24. Id. at 711-12. Generalizing from this balancing test, one commentator has read Nixon
I to allow "[e]ach branch [to] act until it usurps another's power." Chemerinsky, Controlling
Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework for Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
863, 873 (1983).
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ality"25 to counter a "demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pend-
ing trial."26
The forces that drove the Court to unaccustomed unanimity and
dispatch in resolving the President's challenge to the special prosecutor
inhibited the Justices from delineating a clear approach to the separation
problems presented.27 Given the atmosphere of a government in crisis
during the tapes controversy, the Justices may have purchased consensus
at the expense of masking their disagreements on separation methodol-
ogy. The Court's opinion suggests some disagreement. Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court, met President Nixon's formal challenge to
the Courts' subpoena authority-his claim of absolute privilege-with an
equally formal assertion of the judicial power "'to say what the law
is.' "28 Having staked this formal claim to the judicial power to resolve
the controversy, the Court moved to a functional, ad hoe balancing test
to determine "the scope of judicial power"29 to enforce a subpoena for
confidential presidential communications.3" The Nixon I opinion can
support two distinct approaches to separation problems-one based on a
formal separation of governmental powers, the other on an ad hoc func-
tional analysis,-or, perhaps, some combination of the two.31 To cloud
matters further, the Court offered no theoretical justification for either
approach. In sum, the Court's decision in Nixon I facilitated resolution
of a constitutional and political crisis, but contributed to separation-of-
powers theory only by sketching the terms of future debate.32
The fragility of the Nixon I consensus became clear when the Court
considered the confidentiality of President Nixon's tapes and documents
in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (Nixon II). 3 In Nixon II,
the Court upheld an act of Congress that controlled the disposition of
25. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 711-12. The Court suggested that the President's position would
have been far stronger had he been able to ground his claim on "military or diplomatic
secrets." Id. at 710.
26. Id. at 713.
27. See Mishkin, supra note 5, at 86-91; Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Re-
view of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 116, 120-30 (1974).
28. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 703 (citations omitted); see supra note 23.
29. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 703.
30. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and The
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 617 (1984).
31. Commentators generally have found ad hoc functionalism to predominate in Nixon I.
See, e.g., Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Powers Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 715, 729 (1984); Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 872-74; Strauss, supra note,30, at 616-
17..
32. See Henkin, Executive Privilege: Mr. Nixon Loses But the Presidency Largely Prevails,
22 UCLA L. REV. 40, 45-46 (1974).
33. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
President Nixon's presidential papers and tape recordings against a
claimed violation of separation of powers.34 Unlike Nixon I, Nixon II
openly divided the Court. The Justices differed not only over the out-
come, but more strikingly over methodology and the very meaning of
separation of powers." Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
adopted a "pragmatic, flexible approach"36 to separation problems
grounded on the theory that the separation of powers does not contem-
plate a "complete division of authority"37 among the branches. Apply-
ing the ad hoc balancing approach of Nixon I to assess claimed intrusions
by Congress on executive authority, Justice Brennan sketched the follow-
ing, decidedly functional test:
[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance be-
tween the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the
extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplish-
ing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the poten-
tial for disruption is present must we then determine whether that
impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives
within the constitutional authority of Congress.38
Following this approach, the Court found it "highly relevant" that the
Act allowed custody of the presidential records to remain with officials of
the executive branch.39 The Court found this arrangement "clearly less
intrusive" than provision for custody and screening of the records by
congressional officials or outside agencies.4°
To Chief Justice Burger, writing in dissent, Congress' provision for
executive custody did not matter at all.4 ' For Congress to legislate in the
area of presidential materials was unconstitutional per se.4' He ex-
plained: "Whether there has been a violation of separation-of-powers
principles depends, not on the identity of the custodians, but upon which
branch has commanded the custodians to act. Here, Congress has given
the command.",4 3 Chief Justice Burger's formal approach followed from
his adoption of a definition of separation of powers that the majority
rejected, namely, "the constitutionally rooted independence of each
34. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V
1970); Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 441.
35. Nixon I1, 433 U.S. at 441-43; id. at 505-09 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 442.
37. Id. at 443.
38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 443-44.
41. Id. at 513 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. The Chief Justice added, "[i]f separation-of-powers principles can be so easily
evaded, then the constitutional separation is a sham." Id.
43. Id.
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branch of Government."'  His theory of'separation of powers led the
Chief Justice, who had written Nixon I, to reject the majority's adapta-
tion of the ad hoc balancing inquiry.45
This contest between formalist and functional approaches to separa-
tion problems hardly began with Nixon I. Not only did the debate sur-
face discreetly amid the unanimity of Nixon 1,46 but it had dominated
separation-of-powers discourse at least since the beginning of this cen-
tury.47 Justice Holmes, like Justice Brennan in Nixon II, once reminded
his colleagues that the Constitution does not "divide the branches into
watertight compartments, ' 48 explaining that "[t]he great ordinances of
the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white."49
Later and in similar fashion, Justice Frankfurter chided Justice Black
that "the content of the three authorities of government is not to be dt-
rived from an abstract analysis. The areas are partly interacting, not
wholly disjointed. The Constitution is a framework for government." 50
What distinguishes the Nixon II interplay from earlier manifesta-
tions of the tension between formal and functional approaches to separa-
tion problems is not the debate itself, but its repercussions. Earlier
Supreme Court decisions elaborating the separation of powers were usu-
ally followed by long periods of silence.5' Thus, regardless of the rheto-
ric of its opinions, as an empirical matter, the Court played a minor role
as arbiter of the separation of powers. The Nixon cases, by contrast,
44. Id. at 511; see id. at 510.
45. Id. at 511-12.
46. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. Between the two Nixon decisions, the
Court wrote yet another opinion on the separation of powers that reflected tension between the
fundtionalist and formalist leanings of the Justices. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the
Court held that provisions of a federal election statute, which, among other things, authorized
congressional officials to appoint members of the Federal Election Commission, violated the
Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.. Buckley, 424
U.S. at 109-43. When discussing their conception of the separation of powers, the Justices
stressed a functional orientation. See id. at 120-23. That discussion was balanced, however, by
language that echoed Chief Justice Burger's Nixon opinions. "This Court," the Justices as-
serted, "has not hesitated to enforce the principle of separation of powers embodied in the
Constitution when its application has proved necessary for the decisions of cases or controver-
sies properly before it." Id. at 123. In Buckley, that activism took root when the Court for-
bade the Commission "as presently constituted" from exercising its powers. Id. at 143.
47. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV
491, 492-506 (1987); Strauss, supra note 1, at 489.
48. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 209.
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
51. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
served as a precursor to a series of Supreme Court decisions that at-
tempted to delineate a systematic approach to the separation of powers.
B. The Chadha Decision
The most important of the post-Nixon decisions, and perhaps the
most enigmatic, has proven to be Immigration and Nationalization Ser-
vice v. Chadha.5 2 In Chadha, the Court struck down the so-called "legis-
lative veto"53 on separation-of-powers grounds. 4 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, proceeded from the formalism and strict scru-
tiny of his Nixon II dissent. The Chief Justice staked out the formalist.
ground at the outset of his separation-of-powers analysis:
[T]hat a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and effi-
ciency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks--of demo-
cratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than
blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appear-
ing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority
to executive and independent agencies . . . .
Chief Justice Burger conceded the "utilitarian argument"56 to the propo-
nents of the legislative veto, but reasoned that "policy arguments sup-
porting even useful 'political inventions' are subject to the demands of
the Constitution which defines powers and, with respect to this subject,
sets out just how those powers are to be exercised." '57
The Chadha opinion expresses the formalist's belief in the power of
text and history to determine outcomes in contested cases, stating that
"[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and
define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in
the legislative process."58 For text, the Court relied on those provisions
of Article I that require bicameral passage and presentment of bills
52. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). One measure of Chadha's significance is the thoughtfulness of
the commentary it has generated. See, e.g., Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Consti-
tution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. Cr. REV. 125; Strauss, Was There
a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983
DUKE L.J. 789; Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law By Any Other Name?, 21 HARV.
J. oN LEGIS. 1 (1984).
53. The "legislative veto" is a means by which Congress, or part of Congress, can invali-
date actions taken by an administrative agency or an executive official. Chadha, 492 U.S. at
957-58.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 944.
56. Id. at 945. The Chief Justice could not help remarking that "the long range political
wisdom of [the legislative veto] 'invention' is arguable." Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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before they become law.59 From their reading of the history underlying
these provisions, the Justices were confident of "the Framers' decision
that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in ac-
cord with [the] single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, proce-
dure" 60 described in the bicameralism and presentment provisions.
Despite the apparent certitude of Chief Justice Burger's prelude, the
Court's analysis of the constitutionality of the legislative veto exudes un-
certainty. This uncertainty stems from a gap in the text: the Constitu-
tion says nothing about legislative vetoes. 61 The Court plugged the
textual gap by equating a legislative veto with a "law," to which the bi-
cameralism and presentment provisions apply. Thus the legislative veto
was unconstitutional because it was a law enacted by Congress pursuant
to a deficient process.
62
The Court's attempt to apply a simple solution to a difficult problem
has resulted in considerable confusion surrounding the Chadha principle.
The effort in Chadha to distinguish the lawmaking aspects of a legislative
veto from those of the routine decision making of administrative agencies
has proven unsuccessful.6" The failure of the Court's justification for the
59. Id. at 945; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, § 7, cls. 2-3.
60. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951; see also id. at 946-51.
61. See id. at 977 (White, J., dissenting). The silence of the Constitution with respect to
legislative vetoes should not be surprising, since, as Justice White pointed out, the legislative
veto was not invented until the Great Depression. Id. at 968.
62. Id. at 951-59. The legislative veto at issue in Chadha violated the Constitution's bi-
cameral requirement because it, like many similar provisions, allowed the action of one house
of Congress to override an administrative decision. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7. Because
the Chadha provision, like all legislative vetoes, did not allow for presidential signature, it
violated the Presentment Clauses of the Constitution as well. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls.
2-3.
63. The Court found the veto "essentially legislative" because it "had the purpose and
effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons ... outside the Legislative
Branch." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. This conclusion assumes, of course, that Chadha had a
"right" before the legislative veto took effect. In another view of the decision-making dy-
namic, the administrative decision could be seen as a recommendation to Congress vesting
legal rights in individuals only if Congress chooses not to veto the decision. See id. at 994-98
(White, J., dissenting); Elliott, supra note 52, at 134-38. As Professor Elliott noted, Justice
White's alternative construction of the "legal" effect of a legislative veto does not prove the
Court wrong, but does show that the Court's characterization of the veto was "arbitrary."
Elliott, supra note 52, at 135. He explained: "The legislative veto 'alters legal rights' only
because the Court superimposes that conceptualization .... It would be equally plausible (and
equally arbitrary) to manipulate the Court's abstract legal categories to say that the legislative
veto did not alter legal rights." Id. at 135-36.
Another difficulty with the Court's reliance on the "affects legal rights" criterion is that
court decisions and administrative decisions also affect legal rights, but the Court would not
consider them to be "essentially legislative." See Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About
Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 430, 471-72 (1987); Tribe,
supra note 52, at 9. Chief Justice Burger's response to this argument relied heavily on the
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outcome in Chadha has led to a search for a more satisfying account of
the decision.
Two formalist interpretations6 compete as plausible alternatives for
a Chadha principle deeper than that offered by the Court.65 Rather than
viewing a legislative veto as an improperly enacted "law," these interpre-
tations see a legislative veto as an improper attempt by Congress to share
in the administration of statutes.66 The first alternative interpretation is
referred to here as the "archformalist" reading of Chadha. The
archformalist interpretation arises from the rhetoric in Chadha sug-
gesting the Court found the legislative veto unconstitutional by reasoning
deductively from abstract principles flowing from a grand theory of sepa-
rated powers. 67 This theory asserts the related beliefs that the Constitu-
tion divides governmental power "into three defined categories"68 and
that it ensures "as nearly as possible, that each branch of government
observation that "[w]hen any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Consti-
tution has delegated to it." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. See id. at 953 n. 16. This explanation
obscures the constitutional issue by collapsing the distinction between action and actor. See
Sargentich, supra, at 471-72; Strauss, supra note 52, at 796-98.
64. Labeling an interpretation "formalist," is often considered condemnatory. The terms
"formal," "formalist," and "formalism" are used here descriptively, however, not pejoratively.
"Formalist" is here intended to mean an interpretative strategy that advocates decision making
by rules. See P.S. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW 2 (1987); Sargentich, supra note 63, at 458 n. 131; Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509,
510 (1988) ("At the heart of the word 'formalism', in many of its numerous uses, lies the
concept of decision making according to rule.") (emphasis in original). Formalist interpreta-
tion is associated not only with a commitment to rule-driven decision making, but also with a
high degree of confidence in the ability of the interpreter to derive clear meaning from written
language. See P.S. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra, at 14-16. Thus, a formal method of consti-
tutional interpretation would expect "the text of the Constitution and the intent of its drafters
[to] furnish clear answers" in concrete cases. Sunstein, Changing Conceptions of Administra-
lion, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 927, 944. In its broadest (and most pejorative) sense, formalism
suggests a conception of legal reasoning that views law as a closed, complete system of objec-
tively determinable rules that yield correct outcomes through a noncontroversial process of
deductive reasoning. See Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PIr. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1983).
Formalist claims become less defensible and more susceptible to charges of conceptualism and
mechanical jurisprudence as they move away from their core appeal to rule-driven decision
making. See P. S. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra, at 28-30. For a stimulating effort to defend
legal formalism while separating it from mechanical interpretive strategies, see Weinrib, Legal
Formalism: On the Imminent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988).
65. Though either interpretation would fit the outcome of Chadha, the interpretations
differ importantly in their implications for other separation-of-powers problems.
66. Justice White suggested this recasting of the Chadha problem when he noted in his
dissenting opinion that under the Court's approach Congress could delegate authority to
others but not to itself. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 986-87.
67. Professor Grey has noted that formalism includes "legal theories that stress the im-
portance of rationally uncontroversial reasoning in legal decision, whether from highly partic-
ular rules or quite abstract principles." See Grey, supra note 64, at 9.
68. Chadha, 462 U.S. ai 951.
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would confine itself to its assigned responsibility."69 Archformalist prin-
ciples would condemn the legislative veto simply because Congress in-
fringed the "independence" 70 of executive officials by constraining their
authority to administer statutes as they thought best.
Archformalist theory not only posits that clear boundaries divide
the powers of the several branches, but also asserts a need for the Court
to police against incursions across those boundaries. As Chief Justice
Burger explained in Chadha, the "hydraulic pressure inherent within
each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power,
even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted."'" A final
component of archformalist thinking is its insistence that arguments for
governmental efficiency and policy are irrelevant to the Court's concep-
tual analysis. In Chadha, for example, the Court both opened and closed
its discussion of separation of powers with vigorous repudiations of such
functional inquiries.72
The second interpretation of Chadha, referred to here as the
"demiformalist" interpretation, differs from archformalism primarily in
the scope of its vision. The demiformalist approach derives its rules of
decision from the specific constitutional text implicated by a government
practice under challenge, as well as from the history associated with the
drafting of that text. The demiformalism of the Chadha opinion is re-
flected in the Court's attention to the bicameralism and presentment pro-
visions of the Constitution,73 and in its reliance on the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.74
69. Id.
70. The idea of executive independence can be traced to Chief Justice Burger's dissenting
opinion in Nixon II. See 433 U.S. at 511. In Nixon II, Chief Justice Burger would have held
impermissible any congressional to attempt to control the disposition of presidential papers.
See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
71. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. In Nixon II, the dissenting Chief Justice Burger argued for
strict scrutiny in separation cases. 433 U.S. at 506-07. Later decisions make clear that the
archformalist would exercise this policing function with a special skepticism toward assertions
of power by Congress, viewing the legislature as the branch most threatening to the equilib-
rium of the governing structure. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986).
72. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-45, 958-59.
73. See id. at 945-51.
74. This interpretative canon holds that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the
other. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979). Viewing the constitutional text, the
Court "slaw] that when the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act
alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely de-
fined the procedures for such action." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955. Because the legislative veto
did not fit within one of those defined provisions, the Court found it an unauthorized bypass of
the lawmaking requirements of Article I. See id. at 955-58. For convincing criticism of the
Court's analysis, see Elliott, supra note 52, at 139-44.
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The demiformalist and archformalist approaches differ not only in
the grandness of the authority from which they proceed, but also in the
breadth of the rules they formulate. For example, the demiformalist
would invalidate a legislative veto because it violates the principle that
Congress is powerless to assert any formal role in the administration of
statutes it has enacted. The archformalist conception would reach be-
yond the demiformalist principle, invalidating not only active adminis-
tration by Congress, but also any statutory curtailment of the executive
branch to control administration. Although the implications of these in-
terpretations differ greatly, the Court in Chadha was not required to
choose between them because each would render a legislative veto
unconstitutional.
C. The Bowsher and Schor Decisions
The Chadha principle was refined in Bowsher v. Synar,75 in which
the Court invalidated a portion of an act of Congress designed to bring
the federal budget into balance over a period of several years.76 The Act
would have established ceilings on federal deficits for each of five fiscal
years, progressively reducing the deficit until its eventual elimination in
the fifth year.77 The program's constitutional flaw centered on the re-
sponsibility provided to the Comptroller General to prepare a report esti-
mating federal revenue and spending for each fiscal year, together with
the spending cuts necessary to reduce the deficit to the statutorily desig-
nated level.78
Chief Justice Burger, again writing for the majority, found that the
Comptroller General's reporting function "plainly entail[ed] execution of
the law in constitutional terms."7 9 However, the statute giving authority
to the Comptroller General also made him or her removable for cause by
joint resolution of Congress. 0 The Court held that the existence of con-
gressional removal authority made the Comptroller General, for consti-
tutional purposes, a legislative official." The budget-balancing act
violated separation of powers because here, as in Chadha, Congress at-
75. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
76. Balanced Budget and Emergency Defecit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act of
1985, 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. IV 1986).
77. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 717-18.
78. Id. at 732-34. The Act would have required the President to order budget cuts in
conformance with the Comptroller General's report. Id. at 733.
79. Id. at 732-33.
80. Id. at 732.
81. "In constitutional terms," the Chief Justice explained, "the removal powers over the
Comptroller General's office dictate that he will be subservient to Congress." Id. at 730.
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tempted to control the execution of the laws it enacted. 2
In a sense, then, the formalism of Bowsher simply tracks that of
Chadha. In its outcome and at the core of its analysis, Bowsher is an
application of the demiformalist principle that Congress cannot author-
ize itself to play an active role in the administration of statutes.8 3 But the
formalism of Bowsher is more pronounced than that of Chadha, not so
much in doctrine or interpretive style, but in the very aridity of the
Court's analysis. In Chadha, there was active congressional involvement
in the administration of law: a house of Congress vetoed an administra-
tive decision. In Bowsher, the involvement of Congress is less clear. The
factor the Court found "critical" ' 4-the removability of a Comptroller
General by Congress-had not actively involved Congress in the execu-
tion of the budget act. That removal authority was "carefully circum-
scribed" 5 and had lain dormant since the creation of the office of
Comptroller General in 1921.86 Justice White's interpretation of the his-
torical record is compelling: "The practical result of the removal provi-
sion is not to render the Comptroller unduly dependent upon or
subservient to Congress, but to render him one of the most independent
officers in the entire federal establishment.
87
A second look at Bowsher, then, suggests the possibility that the
Court adopted the archformalist view that the budget act encroached on
executive autonomy by providing executive authority to an official in-
dependent of Presidential control.88 Archformalist rhetoric in the
Court's introductory discussion of the separation of powers, which was
more elaborate and more pronounced than the parallel discussion in
82. Id. at 733-34.
83. The Court explained its holding in demiformalist terms:
[U]ndoubtedly the content of the Act determines the nature of the executive duty.
However, as Chadha makes clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting legisla-
tion, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its en-
actment only indirectly-by passing new legislation.... By placing the responsibility
for execution of the... Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only
by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and has
intruded into the executive function. The Constitution does not permit such
intrusion.
Id. at 733-34.
84. Id. at 727.
85. Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 770-72 (White, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 773 (White, J. dissenting).
87. Id. at 773 (White, J., dissenting). One commentator has found the "factual premise"
that the removability of the Comptroller "created congressional control over his administra-
tion" to be "the most difficult element of the analysis, taken on its own terms." Strauss, supra
note 1, at 498.
88. See Gifford, The Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Regulatory Agencies After
Bowsher v. Synar, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 441, 445-46, 471 (1987).
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Chadha, supports this reading of Bowsher. Chief Justice Burger empha-
sized that the executive branch is "separate and wholly independent"
from the legislature,89 and sought to support that view with references to
the Constitution and by drawing distinctions between the constitutional
system and "parliamentary systems."90 This concern for executive inde-
pendence was underscored by an explicit warning against inherent "dan-
gers of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions." 9'
Moreover, the Chief Justice rejected the functional concerns of govern-
mental efficiency and cooperation completely:
That this system of division and separation of powers produces
conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it
was deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous, and open
debate on the great issues affecting the people and to provide ave-
nues for the operation of checks on the exercise of governmental
power.92
Notwithstanding its rhetorical flourishes, the Court's opinion in
Bowsher reflects considerable ambivalence toward archformalism. The
Court stopped short of holding that those who exercise executive powers
must be subject to removal at will by the President,93 holding more nar-
rowly that "Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an
officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment.",
94
The Bowsher decision left untouched statutes that condition presidential
removal of certain officials on a showing of specified causes. The inter-
ests protected by the narrowness of the decision are clear: had the Court
signaled that Congress could not protect the tenure of administrators by
limiting the President's power of removal, its holding would have raised
significant doubt as to the constitutionality of the so-called independent
agencies. In allaying those fears,95 the Court drew from Chadha the
demiformalist principle against congressional execution of statutes, in-
stead of the archformalist prescription for executive autonomy. Perhaps
in doing so, the Justices demonstrated an understanding of the structural
revolution that would follow the adoption of archformalism.
89. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 727.
92. Id. at 722.
93. Id. at 760-61 (White, J., dissenting). The significance of this reluctance is heightened
in light of the Solicitor General's urging that the Court accept this view of executive auton-
omy. See id. at 761.
94. Id. at 726.
95. Id. at 725 n.4; see Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v.
Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779, 791-92. But see Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT.
REV. 41, 95-96.
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The Court's reluctance to embrace archformalism as a settled ap-
proach to separation of powers was stunningly clear in a less discussed
decision announced the same day as Bowsher, Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission v. Schor.9 6 In Schor, the Court held that an act of Con-
gress that authorized a federal administrative agency to adjudicate state-
law counterclaims97 did not violate separation-of-powers principles. In
doing so, the Court rejected an argument that the statute impinged on
the independence of the federal judiciary as guaranteed by Article III of
the Constitution.98 In an earlier decision, a plurality of the Justices held
that state-law claims could only be adjudicated by Article III courts be-
cause such claims are disputes over private rights at the "core" of the
federal judiciary's article III powers.9 9 In Schor, the Court swept aside
the formalism of the earlier plurality decision," embracing the function-
alism of Nixon II:
In determining the extent to which a given congressional decision
to authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-Arti-
cle III tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity
of the Judicial Branch, the Court has declined to adopt formalistic
and unbending rules.... Although such rules might lend a greater
degree of coherence to this area of the law, they might also unduly
constrict Congress' ability to take needed and innovative action
pursuant to its Article I powers.101
The difference in approach and tone between the Bowsher and Schor
opinions could not be more pronounced. The Court's embrace of func-
tionalism and rejection of formalism were as pervasive in the Schor opin-
ion as was the Court's archformalist rhetoric in Bowsher and Chadha.
102
In his Schor dissent, Justice Brennan maintained that "[i]t is impossible
to reconcile the radically different approaches the Court takes to separa-
tion of powers in this case and in Bowsher." 103 The difference between
the Schor and Bowsher opinions clearly manifests itself in their outcomes.
In Schor, the Court acknowledged that a "core" judicial function had
been transferred from the judiciary to another branch. In striking con-
trast to Bowsher, however, the Court saw "little practical reason to find
that this single deviation from the agency model is fatal to the congres-
96. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
97. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
98. Schor, 478 U.S. at 847-57.
99. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-70 (1982).
100. The plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline has been considered a product of the same
turn to separation formalism that produced Chadha. See Strauss, supra note 30, at 626, 629-
39.
101. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
102. See, e.g., id. at 847-48, 851-57.
103. Id. at 865 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sional scheme." 1" The Court's willingness to accept "de minimis" intru-
sions on the judicial branch"'5 makes Schor at best an uneasy companion
to Bowsher. 1
06
Notwithstanding the tension between Schor and Bowsher, the Court
made only the slightest attempt to reconcile the two cases. The Court in
Schor explained Bowsher as a case involving "the aggrandizement of con-
gressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch."1 °7 Schor, by
contrast, only involved the question whether Congress had impermissibly
undermined the judiciary, without expanding its own power.10 8 Aggran-
dizement at the expense of another branch is more threatening, in the
Schor Court's view, than simple interference with another branch. 10 9
But the Court's reliance on such a distinction creates difficulties. A
distinction between aggrandizing one's power and undermining another's
is, at best, difficult to employ and, at worst, empty. A judicial decision
whether one has "aggrandized" one's own or "undermined" another's
authority is freighted with unstated value judgments tied to the deci-
sionmaker's prior theoretical understanding of the appropriate allocation
of authority. 110 For example, in his Chadha dissent, Justice White
viewed the legislative veto as an instrument of self-defense, not aggran-
dizement.111 Even if the distinction between aggrandizement and under-
mining were workable, this distinction might help account only for the
different outcomes in the two cases, but would not justify the radical
difference in the methodologies the Court employed. Certainly in Schor
the Court did not suggest that the aggrandizing/undermining distinction
could bear the weight of reconciling the two methodologies. Perhaps
more significantly, in Bowsher the Court did not engage in any evaluation
of the presence or absence of "aggrandizement.""' 2 This seems a curious
omission if such a finding was the fulcrum for choosing between a for-
104. Id. at 852.
105. Id. at 856.
106. Id. at 865 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 856. The Court's suggestion in Schor that, "consistent with Bowsher, [we have]
looked to a number of factors in evaluating the extent to which the congressional scheme
endangers separation of powers principles under the circumstances," id. at 857, is unconvinc-
ing. Although the Court in Bowsher did discuss a number of attributes of the Comptroller's
status, Chief Justice Burger made it clear that it was the existence of removal power in Con-
gress, without more, that made the Comptroller General ineligible to receive administrative
power. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732.
108. Schor, 478 U.S. at 856-57.
109. Id.
110. See Bruff, supra note 15, at 547.
111. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 974.
112. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 520.
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malist or functionalist approach.
11 3
As the constitutional challenge to the independent counsel provision
of the Ethics Act worked its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, considera-
ble uncertainty haunted separation-of-powers doctrine. Indeed, most is-
sues concerning separation principles were in doubt. The Schor and
Bowsher decisions offered a stark choice between competing functional
and formal methodologies for separation problems and made clear the
importance in choosing between them. The principles for guiding that
choice were less clear. Moreover, if the Court chose a formalist ap-
proach, the ambivalence of Chadha and Bowsher made it uncertain how
far the Court would go to ensure the ideal of "separate and wholly in-
dependent" branches. Olson's challenge to the Ethics Act's provision for
an independent counsel was, in essence, a challenge to the Supreme
Court's approach to separation-of-powers issues.
II. The Olson Decision
A. The Statutory Framework
Congress' response to the constitutional controversies raised during
the Nixon Administration was profound. Having diagnosed the execu-
tive's constitutional overreaching as symptomatic-indeed, symbolic-of
the "imperial presidency,"114 Congress enacted a series of oversight laws
during the mid- to late-1970s.1 15 With these laws, Congress created
structural checks on executive authority in an effort to prevent abuses of
power by the executive branch. Typically, the policing function was ex-
ercised by a government official clothed with a statutorily guaranteed in-
dependence from executive control.'1 6 The executive branch challenged
the constitutionality of these laws on separation-of-powers grounds, ar-
guing that the creation of these independent offices infringed the Presi-
dent's authority to control the execution of laws.11 7 Perhaps the most
controversial of these oversight laws has been the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act.1 8
113. For a discussion more sympathetic to this use of the aggrandizing/undermining dis-
tinction, see id. at 517-22.
114. See Tiefer, supra note 15, at 59. The phrase "imperial presidency" is taken from the
title of Arthur Schlesinger's book, which was influential during this period. See A. SCHLEs-
INGER JR., supra note 5. Professor Schlesinger used the term "imperial presidency" to de-
scribe "the appropriation by the Presidency, and particularly by the contemporary Presidency,
of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress." Id. at viii.
115. See Tiefer, supra note 15, at 59-60.
116. See id. at 59.
117. See id. at 60.
118. 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (West Supp. 1988).
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Congress first enacted the independent counsel provisions in 1978,
during the height of the oversight legislation revival. Before that time,
when llegations of corruption were made against high-level government
officials, attorneys general appointed special prosecutors on occasion, but
only when political pressure required them to do so." 9 This was the
pattern followed during the Watergate scandal, when Archibald Cox was
hired as special prosecutor. After Mr. Cox was fired for seeking access to
the White House tapes, however, policymakers felt the need for a struc-
tural solution to the conflict of interest faced by the Attorney General
when investigating close colleagues and political associates. 20 Congress
proceeded deliberately, recognizing that subtle separation-of-powers con-
cerns inhere in any congressional attempt to hold senior executive offi-
cials accountable under the criminal law. Three Congresses spent five
years in hearings, debate, and study before settling on the Ethics Act.' 2 '
The Ethics Act provides for the appointment of "independent coun-
sel" to investigate and prosecute allegations of criminal wrongdoing by
designated senior executive branch officials.' 22 The independent counsel
provisions reflect a careful balancing of separation-of-powers concerns at
every critical juncture in the process of investigation and prosecution. If,
after performing a preliminary investigation,' 23 the Attorney General de-
termines that there are "reasonable grounds to believe that further inves-
tigation is warranted,"' 24 he or she must apply to a special division of the
119. For a brief, historical recounting of these episodes, see In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 39-43
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
120. See S.REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4216, 4218; Levin, supra note 15, at 73-75.
121. For a history of congressional deliberations culminating in the Ethics Act of 1978, see
Kramer & Smith, supra note 15, at 963-66. In December 1987, Congress reenacted the in-
dependent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act with several amendments. Pub. L. No. 100-
191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987). The Act, as amended in 1987, is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-
599. This Article refers to the Act as reenacted in 1987 when discussing the statutory provi-
sions relating to the independent counsel.
122. The executive officials designated as possible targets of an investigation by the in-
dependent counsel are the President, the Vice President, members of the Cabinet, the Director
and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and se-
nior officials within the Justice Department. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1987). Possible targets also
include senior officials within the President's campaign apparatus. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(8). The
Attorney General may also seek appointment of an independent counsel whenever an investi-
gation "may result in a personal, financial, or political conflict of interest." 28 U.S.C.
§ 591(c)(2).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a). The Act guides the Attorney General's discretion in conducting
the preliminary investigation. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591(d), 592.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(A). In determining whether "reasonable grounds" exist, the
Act commands the Attorney General to "comply with the written or other established policies
of the Department of Justice with respect to the conduct of criminal investigations." 28 U.S.C.
§ 592(c)(1).
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United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
(Special Division) 125 for appointment of independent counsel. 126
In addition to appointing "an appropriate independent counsel," the
Special Division defines the counsel's "prosecutorial jurisdiction."'
' 27
The independent counsel has "full power and independent authority to
exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the
Department of Justice" within the scope of the defined jurisdiction.
128
Under the Act, the independent counsel can be "removed from office,
other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal action
of the Attorney General and only for good cause, physical disability,
mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the
performance of such independent counsel's duties."' 129 In addition, the
Special Division "may terminate an office of independent counsel at any
time, on the ground that the investigation [is] substantially completed
",130
125. The Special Division consists of three circuit judges or Justices of the Supreme Court
appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States for a two-year term. 28 U.S.C. § 49(a), (d).
The statute directs the Chief Justice to give priority to senior judges or retired justices. 28
U.S.C. § 49(c). One of the judges of the Special Division must be from the D.C. Circuit, but
no more than one judge can be named from any one court. 28 U.S.C. § 49(d).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 592(i). The Attorney General is also required to seek appointment of
independent counsel if the ninety-day period for completing the preliminary investigation has
expired, see 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1), and the sixty-day extension, the only one available under
the Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 92(a)(3), has run its course. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(B).
Should the Attorney General decide that further investigation is not warranted, the Spe-
cial Division lacks power to appoint independent counsel and the matter is closed. 28 U.S.C.
§ 592(b)(1). The courts have held that they are unable to review an Attorney General's deci-
sion not to seek appointment of independent counsel. See Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th
Cir. 1986) (Attorney General's failure to discharge duties not subject to challenge in federal
court by private citizens); Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Attorney Gen-
eral's decision not to investigate or seek appointment of independent counsel not reviewable at
behest of members of public).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(1). The Special Division can expand the independent counsel's
jurisdiction only on the request of the Attorney General, id., or on the failure of the Attorney
General to notify the division of court within thirty days that no further investigation is war-
ranted. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c); see also In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a). The independent counsel is, however, required "except where not
possible, [to] comply with the written or other established policies of the Department of Justice
respecting enforcement of the criminal laws." 28 U.S.C. § 594(f). In addition, the statute
provides a measure of congressional oversight "with respect to the official conduct of any
independent counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 595(a).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1). The Attorney General must delineate "the facts found and the
ultimate grounds for such removal." 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(2). The decision by an Attorney
General to remove an independent counsel is subject to judicial review, after which the review-
ing court may reinstate the counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2).
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From the functionalist perspective, the independent counsel mecha-
nism responds to the separation-of-powers concerns that faced Congress
when it sought to regulate the investigation and prosecution of senior
executive officials.' A functional inquiry would focus on the extent to
which the Ethics Act "prevents the Executive Branch from accomplish-
ing its constitutionally assigned functions . *.".., and would assess
whether that interference "is justified by an overriding need to promote
objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress."'
133
The Act's intrusion on executive functions, though clear, is miti-
gated by two considerations. First, the investigation or prosecution of a
senior government official designated by the Act should be an uncommon
occurrence, but in any event is unlike the administrative duties usually
performed by executive officials.134 Second, and more fundamentally, the
Act provides executive officials a meaningful role in administering the
independent counsel process. The Attorney General has sole discretion
in deciding whether to seek the appointment of an independent counsel
or to expand that counsel's jurisdiction.135  In addition, the Attorney
General has the power to remove an independent counsel for cause.
136
The counsel's independence is also tempered by the statutory require-
ment that he or she comply with Justice Department policy unless it is
impossible to do so.' 37  While acknowledging that the Ethics Act, even
with its ameliorative features, intrudes on traditional areas of executive
responsibility, the functionalist would find this intrusion outweighed by
the overriding need to provide for disinterested enforcement of criminal
laws against senior officials. For the functionalist, the Ethics Act's in-
dependent counsel provisions comport with separation-of-powers
principles.
This reading of the Ethics Act is convincing to the functionalist but
is far less persuasive to the archformalist. For the archformalist, who
seeks strict compartmentalization of government functions and the in-
131. See Banks, supra note 15, at 635-36; Bruff, supra note 15, at 551-62.
132. Nixon II, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (citation omitted).
133. Id.
134. See Bruff, supra note 15, at 548-49. The functionalist would not claim that criminal
investigations and prosecutions are themselves atypical executive functions, but that the inves-
tigation and prosecution of senior excecutive officials are unusual circumstances calling for an
extraordinary response.
135. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. The provision for an executive role in the
administration of the Ethics Act is analogous to the provision for executive custody of Presi-
dent Nixon's papers. The Court in Nixon II found this provision "highly relevant." See supra
notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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dependent exercise of those functions, the independent counsel mecha-
nism is a constitutional nightmare. From the archformalist perspective,
the Act's chief defects are inherent in the premise of an "independent"
counsel. An archformalist would not allow Congress to constrain the
exercise of such a traditionally executive function as the conduct of crim-
inal investigations and prosecutions. Nor would the archformalist accept
the exercise of executive authority by one who has significant indepen-
dence from the President. Finally, an archformalist would condemn the
role of the Special Division under the Act, arguing it is improper for
members of the judiciary to exercise such typically executive functions as
appointing prosecutors, determining their jurisdiction, and, if need be,
terminating their authority. In response to the assertion that the Ethics
Act ameliorates the appearance of a conflict of interest that arises when
the Attorney General investigates close associates within the executive
branch, the archformalist would espouse the rhetoric of Chadha and
Bowsher: Arguments based on policy or necessity will not save statutes
that are inconsistent with the constitutional design. 138 From the
archformalist perspective, then, the independent counsel provisions vio-
late separation-of-powers principles.
From the demiformalist perspective, the constitutional problem
posed by the Ethics Act differs significantly from that posed in Bowsher
and Chadha. Although the Ethics Act constrains and largely displaces
executive authority to investigate allegations of high-level government
misconduct, it does not offend the demiformalist principle because Con-
gress does not administer any aspect of the independent counsel pro-
cess. 139 Congress's control over the execution of the Ethics Act ends
with the constraints Congress wrote into the statute.'40 The vacuum left
by the displacement of.executive authority is filled neither by Congress
nor by those under its control, but by the Special Division and the in-
dependent counsel.' Unlike Bowsher and Chadha, the archformalist
and demiformalist positions diverge over the constitutionality of the Eth-
ics Act.
A constitutional challenge to the independent counsel provisions of
the Ethics Act provided the Court with an opportunity to clarify separa-
tion-of-powers methodology. Moreover, the Ethics Act tested the impli-
138. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S 919, 944
(1983).
139. See Banks, supra note 15, at 631.
140. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733-34.
141. The Act does provide for a measure of congressional oversight of the independent
counsel's activities, 28 U.S.C. § 595, but that oversight is traditional in nature and does not
approach the administrative responsibilities condemned in Chadha and Bowsher.
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cations of the far-reaching rhetoric pervading the Bowsher and Chadha
opinions.
B. The Olson Case in the Lower Courts
The controversy that produced the Olson litigation,142 like the con-
troversy in Nixon 1, arose when the President invoked executive privilege
in response to a subpoena for documents. In Olson, two House subcom-
mittees examined the Executive's enforcement of the so-called Superfund
Law. "'43 After the conflict over the superfund documents subsided,'" the
House Judiciary Committee investigated the role of the Justice Depart-
ment in the controversy. Olson, a senior Justice Department official, tes-
tified before a House subcommittee, but did so, at least in the view of the
Judiciary Committee, in a "false and misleading" manner.14 The Chair
of the Judiciary Committee invoked the Ethics Act and requested the
Attorney General to ask for an independent counsel to investigate Olson
and two other Justice Department officials.' 46 After his own preliminary
investigation, the Attorney General requested that the Special Division
appoint independent counsel to investigate Olson's actions.' 47
The Special Division appointed an independent counsel, who had a
grand jury subpoena Olson. 148 Olson responded with a separation-of-
powers challenge to the Ethics Act, claiming that the independent coun-
sel had no constitutional authority to proceed against him.149 The dis-
trict court, adopting the "pragmatic, flexible approach" of Nixon II
functionalism, 50 had no trouble upholding the Act or enforcing the
subpoena. 15
142. The court of appeals and the Supreme Court described the facts surrounding the Ol-
son litigation in different ways. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 478-81 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2605-07 (1988); see also Levin, supra note
15, at 80-84 (discussing Olson litigation as example of Attorney General Meese's failure to
properly administer Ethics Act).
143. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657; see Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2605.
144. The President and the House reached a compromise when the Administration allowed
the House committees to have limited access to the documents. See Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2605.
145. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2605-06.
146. Id. at 2606. The House committee found that the two other officials had obstructed
the investigation by withholding documents. Id.
147. Id. The Attorney General found that the two other officials lacked criminal intent to
obstruct the investigation when they withheld documents. Id.
148. Id. at 2607.
149. Id.
150. In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.
1988), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
151. See id. at 62. The district judge explained his conclusions in a tone reflecting a func-
tionalist's untroubled support for the Act's constitutionality:
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The independent counsel's difficulties arose in the court of appeals,
where Judge Silberman wrote an opinion striking down the independent
counsel provisions of the Act as a violation of separation of powers.
152
Declaring the "constitutional scheme ... as simple as it is complete...
,,,53 the court was deeply troubled by the Ethics Act, which it found
"deliberately departs from [the constitutional] framework" by authoriz-
ing "an officer not accountable to any elected official to prosecute
crimes." '54 Judge Silberman's majority opinion reflects the archformalist
interpretation of the Chadha-Bowsher line of precedent. Notwithstand-
ing his extensive opinion, he found the case easy to decide and the consti-
tutional flaws apparent. The Act not only deviated from the
compartmentalization of government function that lies at the heart of
archformalism, but also represented a destabilizing effort by an aggres-
sive Congress. For Judge Silberman, "[i]t strains belief that ... the
Framers would.., allow Congress, the branch most feared by the Fram-
ers, to abrogate the President's power to appoint Executive Branch
officers."'155
Similarly, because the independent counsel was "charged with an
indisputably executive function," the majority found "an absolute prohi-
bition on any restriction of the President's power to remove a purely
executive officer." '156 The appeals court also found that the Act violated
separation of powers by entrusting an executive function to a federal
judge. 57 The Special Division's power to appoint an independent coun-
sel and to delineate the counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction required the
court to exceed the judicial power that the majority found embodied in
Article III.58
True to the Chadha-Bowsher rhetorical style, Judge Silberman
The Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act represent
Congress's measured response to the recurrent question of how to enforce the laws of
the United States when they are violated by high government officials. Congress
chose to use its authority, well settled under the Constitution and Supreme Court
precedent, to create a mechanism to guarantee the integrity and independence of
criminal investigations in matters where the Department of Justice has real or appar-
ent conflicts of interest. By carefully assigning the functions necessary for the accom-
plishment of its purpose, it has constitutionally addressed an important national
need. For the United States, the Act represents a landmark effort to instill public
confidence in the fair and ethical behavior of public officials.
Id,
152. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
153. Id. at 489.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 482 (citations omitted).
156. See id. at 500-01.
157. Id. at 511.
158. Id. at 511-17.
brushed aside the independent counsel's argument of "necessity," '159 that
a conflict of interest inheres in any attempt by the executive branch to
investigate and prosecute its own senior officials. "As a principle to jus-
tify the use of congressional power to deprive the President of prosecut-
ing authority, .... "worried Judge Silberman, "this contains no feasible
limitation."' 60 The appeals court reasoned that the appropriate cure for
this structural problem is a constitutional commitment to the President's
good-faith supervision of internal investigations and prosecutions and, if
the supervision is found wanting, impeachment. 61 Judge Silberman's re-
jection of the functional argument is squarely within the archformalist
reading of Chadha and Bowsher: "Even were we persuaded that the legis-
lation's 'necessity' were great, . . . we could not approve such a funda-
mental revision to our constitutional scheme."' 62
In her dissent, Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg challenged the major-
ity's archformalism. Rather than arguing that the formalism of Chadha
and Bowsher should be replaced by the functionalism of Nixon II, Judge
Ginsburg sought to synthesize these precedents. She conditioned applica-
tion of Bowsher formalism on the satisfaction of a two-step inquiry:
One first must characterize a given activity as legislative, executive,
or judicial in nature. The inquiry then progresses to the question
whether a different branch exercises supervision of, or control over,
the identified function. Bowsher suggests that any such transfer of
authority would be a violation of the separation principle.' 63
In Judge Ginsburg's view, the Bowsher prohibition did not invali-
date the independent counsel process because the Ethics Act does not
transfer the executive's prosecutorial function to a coordinate branch.'
Rather, the Ethics Act merely limits executive power: "[T]he executive
functions are performed by an officer independent of the other two
branches as well as the executive .... 165 With this finding, she replaced
159. Id. at 504.
160. Id. at 505.
161. Id. at 504-06.
162. Id. at 506; see id. at 507 ("[T]he balance between the need for official accountability
for criminal acts and the prerogative of the President to oversee the execution of the laws, was
struck in the constitution itself.") (Silberman, J.).
163. Id. at 519 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Judge Ginsburg's reading of the Bowsher prohi-
bition is broader than demiformalist interpretation. The demiformalist principle prohibits Con-
gress from engaging in the administration of statutes; Judge Ginsburg would bar any branch
from supervising the functions allocated to another branch.
164. Id. at 519-23.
165. Id. at 523. Judge Ginsburg found that the Act did not replace executive control with
judicial control, arguing that "the court's role is more administrative than supervisory." Id. at
520. She argued that because the Special Division's "discretion is constrained at every junc-
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the formalism of Bowsher with the functionalism of Schor.166 Judge
Ginsburg justified her vision of a two-tiered separation-of-powers meth-
odology by drawing on the complementary strength of the differing ap-
proaches of Bowsher and Schor:
Where one branch appropriates the functions of another the sepa-
ration of powers issue arises most pointedly. In these cases a
straight-forward, "formalistic" analysis is indeed the order of the
day .... But a measure such as the one before us presents a more
subtle problem. The danger of creating an imbalance among the
three branches by taking some business away from one of them is
in all cases a vital concern, but the actual effects of each apparent
limitation should be examined with care. A more fluid, functional
approach is appropriate if we are to preserve the full range of struc-
tural values encompassed under the heading of separation of
powers. '67
Judge Ginsburg had little difficulty finding that the Act satisfied func-
tional concerns.
168
ture, there is no transfer of the prosecutorial function to the judicial branch of government."
Id. at 523 (emphasis in original).
166. Id. at 523.
167. Id. at 524 (citations omitted). Judge Ginsburg's two-tier approach tracks the aggran-
dizing/undermining distinction suggested in Schor. See supra notes 107-112 and accompany-
ing text.
168. Judge Ginsburg's functional analysis focused on the following factors: "the extent of
the removal [of executive power], whether the limitation affects a core executive function, and
the purposes of the legislation." In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 525. As to the first factor, she
found that the Ethics Act amounts to only "a limited incursion into executive territory." Id.
Under the independent counsel scheme, the Attorney General retained "very significant au-
thority at the crucial junctures ...." Id. In addition, the independent counsel, though given
broad investigative and prosecutorial authority, nevertheless is restricted to "a circumscribed
mission." Id. at 526. With respect to the second consideration, Judge Ginsburg questioned a
premise that Judge Silberman found obvious-"that prosecution is at the 'core' of the execu-
tive branch's constitutionally-assigned functions, in the sense that the job must be kept, in any
and all cases, under the President's wing and cover." Id.; cf id. at 487-89, 500-01 (majority
opinion). Regarding Congress' purpose in drafting the Act, Judge Ginsburg found that the
independent counsel mechanism was intended to implement separation-of-powers principles.
Id. at 527 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Act, she noted, was written to "control against abuse
of executive branch power. It implements the checking aspect of the separated powers." Id.
Judge Ginsburg concluded her analysis with this functionalist observation:
Here we have an incursion on the executive domain which, if it is qualitatively more
substantial [than in Schor], is also more blended and connected with the department
affected, witness the large initiating and removal role of the Attorney General. Fur-
thermore, it is not as clearly a disturbance of a "core" function, and it is intended to
serve not merely "legislative convenience," but to vindicate the precise structural
principle against which it must be measured.
Id. at 528 (citations omitted). More specifically, Judge Ginsburg challenged the majority's
conclusions that the Act unconstitutionally infringes the Executive's power to appoint and
remove prosecutorial officials, id. at 528-34, and requires federal judges to exceed constitu-
tional limits on their authority, id. at 534-35.
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These lower court opinions in the Olson case reflect the recent disar-
ray in separation-of-powers doctrine. The district judge ignored the con-
fusion by adopting the "antique" functionalism of Nixon I1. Judge
Silberman ignored Schor and the ambivalence of the formalism reflected
in Chadha and Bowsher, embracing a thoroughgoing archformalist ver-
sion of separation-of-powers methodology. Only Judge Ginsburg at-
tempted to synthesize the Chadha, Bowsher, and Schor precedents, but
her proposed solution has many of the same defects as the aggrandiz-
ing/undermining dichotomy suggested in previous Supreme Court deci-
sions. A two-tier approach to separation problems remains troublesome
because it requires a largely determinative choice between formalist and
functional methodologies. As the Olson litigation approached the
Supreme Court, one could only hope that the difficulties reflected in the
analyses of the lower court judges would induce the Supreme Court to
rethink its approach to separation-of-powers problems.
C. The Supreme Court's Decision in Olson
At the outset of its discussion of the constitutionality of the in-
dependent counsel provisions, the Supreme Court in Olson subtly sug-
gested a different approach to separation-of-powers disputes. To
appreciate the change one must recall the archformalist openings of
Chief Justice Burger's recent separation opinions. In Chadha, for exam-
ple, Chief Justice Burger began the majority's separation discussion with
the archformalist rejection of functionalism, stating
that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it
if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are
not the primary objectives--or the hallmarks--of democratic gov-
ernment and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the
fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with increas-
169ing frequency ....
Chief Justice Burger opened his majority opinion in Bowsher with the
same tone, explaining the archformalist conception of separation of pow-
ers as the division of governmental powers into "three defined catego-
ries" with the allocation of those powers to "separate and wholly
independent" branches.'
70
In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion in
Olson, began the separation discussion without sketching any theoretical
169. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). The Chief Justice's observation quoted in
the text came after acknowledgement of "the presumption that the challenged statute is valid,"
and largely refuted that presumption.
170. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1986) (citations omitted).
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or conceptual framework for the analysis. He began simply and strik-
ingly with the text of the Constitution. 171 Assessing the constitutionality
of the independent counsel process, the Chief Justice's immediate focus
was on the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but
the Congress may by Law vest the appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.' 72
As framed by the text, the first question was whether the independ-
ent counsel is an officer who must be appointed by the President and
approved by the Senate (a "principal" officer), or whether the counsel
qualifies as an "inferior" officer mentioned in the text's exceptions clause,
which would allow Congress to authorize appointment by the President,
a court, or a department head. If the independent counsel is a principal
officer, the Ethics Act's provision for appointment by the Special Divi-
sion would be unconstitutional. If the independent counsel is an inferior
officer, the Act would fit the prescription of the text's exceptions clause,
as it would constitute a law vesting the power of appointment in a court
of law. 
173
Notwithstanding the importance of the distinction between princi-
pal and inferior officers to the application of the Appointments Clause,
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the line separating the two is
"far from clear, and [that] the Framers provided little guidance into
where it should be drawn."' 74 Chief Justice Rehnquist declined to draw
a categorical line derived from his own or the other Justices' grand con-
ception of separation theory.175 Instead, he relied on an ad hoc, func-
tional analysis, determining that independent counsel should be
considered inferior officers.
176
171. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1988).
172. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
173. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2608.
174. Id.
175. Id. This distinguishes the Supreme Court's approach to the application of the Ap-
pointments Clause from that of the court of appeals. Having found the text indeterminate,
Judge Silberman resolved the appointment issues to fit his archformalist conception of govern-
mental structure. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 491-93 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see id. at 482-83.
176. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2608-09. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the following factors as
relevant to his analysis: the independent counsel is removable by the Attorney General, a
"higher Executive Branch" official; the counsel can perform "only certain, limited duties"; the
The Appointments Clause seems satisfied by a finding that in-
dependent counsel are inferior officers. Judge Silberman's opinion for the
court of appeals, however, had suggested an elaborate interpretation of
the exceptions clause that would have prohibited Congress from author-
izing "interbranch appointments of inferior officers." 1" Under such a
limitation, Congress could not authorize a court to appoint any inferior
officer who would serve outside the judicial branch and therefore the
Ethics Act's mechanism for the Special Division's appointment of in-
dependent counsel would be unconstitutional. Chief Justice Rehnquist
rejected a total ban on interbranch appointments, however, responding
that the text of the exceptions clause "admits of no limitation on inter-
branch appointments."
' 178
The Court did not cede unlimited discretion to Congress to arrange
interbranch appointments, but the limitations that the Chief Justice iden-
tified were functional, not formal. The Court said a structural limit on
Congress' authority "would arise if such provisions for [interbranch] ap-
pointment had the potential to impair the constitutional functions as-
signed to one of the branches ... ,,179 Another limit, traced to a 100-
year-old precedent, 180 would invalidate "Congress' decision to vest the
appointment power in the courts . . . if there was some 'incongruity'
between the functions normally performed by the courts and the per-
formance of their duty to appoint."' 8' The Court found no such incon-
gruity in judicial appointment of independent counsel.18 2 Chief Justice
Rehnquist gave a decidedly functionalist explanation for that conclusion:
Congress of course was concerned when it created the office of in-
dependent counsel with the conflicts of interest that could arise in
situations when the Executive Branch is called upon to investigate
its own high-ranking officers. If it were to remove the appointing
authority from the Executive Branch, the most logical place to put
office of the independent counsel has "limited" jurisdiction; and the counsel is "limited in
tenure." Id.
177. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 490-96.
178. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2610. That the text's silence on interbranch appointments should
be interpreted permissively, the Chief Justice argued, was suggested by the language "as they
think proper" in the exceptions clause, which "seems clearly to give Congress significant dis-
cretion to determine whether it is 'proper' to vest the appointment of, for example, executive
officials in the 'courts of Law.'" Id.
179. Id. at 2611; see Nixon II, 433 U.S. 425, 433 (1977).
180. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1880).
181. Olson, 108 S. Ct at 2611.
182. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected Judge Silberman's formal view that there is "an
inherent incongruity about a court having the power to appoint prosecutorial officers," id.
(footnote omitted), observing that the Court has upheld judicial appointment of prosecutors in
several settings. Id.
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it was in the Judicial Branch.
183
This explanation put to rest one aspect of the challenge to the Act's au-
thorization of judicial appointments of independent counsel.184
The Supreme Court also took a less formalist approach to the other
aspect of the challenge than did the court of appeals. The court of ap-
peals held the Ethics Act unconstitutional because it allowed the judges
of the Special Division to exercise such nonjudicial functions as ap-
pointing independent counsel, setting their prosecutorial jurisdiction,
and, if need be, terminating their office.1 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded that the Article III challenge to the Special Division's power to
appoint independent counsel was largely foreclosed by the Court's inter-
pretation of Article II authorizing such an appointment. 8 6 The Court,
also upheld the Act's conferral of several "miscellaneous" powers that
were not tied to the authority of the Appointments Clause.1 87 In the
Court's view, the Special Division constitutionally could exercise these
"miscellaneous" powers because they were "passive" or "ministerial"
and did not amount to a power in the courts "to 'supervise' the independ-
ent counsel in the exercise of her investigative or prosecutorial
authority."
1 88
183. Id. Compare Judge Silberman's rejection of this argument from necessity. See supra
notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
184. The Court also found relevant that the Ethics Act bars the judges of the Special Divi-
sion from participating in matters relating to the independent counsel they have appointed.
Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2611.
185. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 511-17 (D.C. Cir 1984).
186. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2612. The Chief Justice added that "judicial exercise of the power
to appoint, per se, is in [no] way inconsistent as a functional matter with the courts' exercise of
their Article III powers." Id. at 2612-13 & n.16. The Court did not, however, wholeheartedly
endorse the power of the Special Division to determine prosecutorial jurisdiction:
[W]e do not think that Congress may give the Division unlimited discretion to deter-
mine the independent counsel's jurisdiction. In order for the Division's definition of
the counsel's jurisdiction to be truly "incidental" to its power to appoint, the jurisdic-
tion that the court decides upon must be demonstrably related to the factual circum-
stances that gave rise to the Attorney General's investigation and request for the
appointment of the independent counsel in the particular case.
Id. at 2613 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The Court relied on this analysis to
uphold the Special Division's power to expand the independent counsel's jurisdiction. Id. at
2613 n.17.
187. See id. at 2613 (listing powers in question).
188. Id. at 2613-14. For these reasons, the "miscellaneous powers.., do not impermissi-
bly trespass upon the authority of the Executive Branch." Id. at 2613. Following this descrip-
tion of the limited nature of the powers at issue, the Court observed that "the functions that
the Special Division is empowered to perform are not inherently 'Executive'..... Id. at 2614.
The Court added that "they are directly analogous to functions that federal judges perform in
other contexts .... " Id.
The Court found the Special Division's power to terminate the office of the independent
counsel most difficult to justify. The Court acknowledged that the power to terminate the
office of independent counsel is administrative, rather than judicial, but nevertheless upheld
The Court's legitimation of the Ethics Act's appointment provisions
set the tone for the remainder of Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis.
Under similar reasoning, the Court upheld a provision giving the Attor-
ney General power to remove independent counsel only for cause. In
doing so, the Court made clear its adoption of the demiformalist inter-
pretation of Chadha and Bowsher. As the Chief Justice read Bowsher,
Congress cannot "gain a role in the removal of executive officials other
than its established powers of impeachment and conviction."''8 9 The
Ethics Act satisfies that principle because it "puts the removal power
squarely in the hands of the Executive Branch .... ,,190 Thus, "the real
question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that
they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty,
and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that
light."1 91
Although the Court readily acknowledged that some of the in-
dependent counsel's functions are executive in nature,192 that observation
was not dispositive, as it would seem to the archformalist. 193 Instead,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern was whether imposition of a good-
cause limitation on the executive's power to remove an independent
counsel "unduly trammel[ed] ... executive authority. ' 194 Repeating the
factors supporting his conclusion that the independent counsel is an in-
ferior officer within the meaning of the appointments clause, 95 the Chief
Justice held that the good-cause requirement satisfies the concerns of
functional balancing by leaving ample authority in the executive "to as-
sure that the counsel is competently performing her statutory responsi-
bilities in a manner that comports with the [Ethics] Act,"' 196 and that it
accomplished Congress goal of providing "the necessary independence of
the authorization on the functional ground that it does not amount to a "significant judicial
encroachment upon executive power or upon the prosecutorial discretion of the independent
counsel." Id. The Court found that the statutory power to terminate falls short of the power
to remove an independent counsel during an ongoing proceeding (that power is held by the
Attorney General under the Act), but rather was designed to terminate the counsel's office
when the investigation or prosecution is completed and the counsel lacks the good sense to
withdraw from the public payroll. Id.
189. Id. at 2616.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2619.
192. Id.
193. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 496-501 (D.C. Cir. 1988); infra notes 203-207
and accompanying text.
194. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
195. Id; see supra note 174.
196. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
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the office." '197
Finally, the Court explained why the independent counsel process as
a whole does not violate the separation of powers. At this point in the
opinion, however, the analysis is anticlimactic. The Court reintroduced
the aggrandizement theme in distinguishing Bowsher and Chadha, noting
that Congress did not seek "to increase its own powers at the expense of
the Executive Branch" '98 through the Ethics Act. Nor did the Court
find that the Act unconstitutionally undermines the powers of the execu-
tive branch. Though its power is diminished by the independent counsel
process, the Executive nevertheless maintains enough supervisory au-
thority over the independent counsel to satisfy separation concerns.' 99
The impact of Chief Justice Rehnquist's unusually functional conclusion
is heightened by the near unanimity it commanded from the Court.2' °
The archformalist response to Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
came in the form of Justice Scalia's dissent. Justice Scalia chided the
Chief Justice for focusing on "such relatively technical details as the Ap-
pointments Clause and the removal power, addressing briefly and only at
the end of [the] opinion the separation of powers."201 Justice Scalia, who
apparently favored the grand style of Chadha and Bowsher, called this
approach "backwards." ' For Justice Scalia, the crucial constitutional
provision was not the Appointments Clause, but the introductory clause
of Article II, which vests the "executive Power ... in a President of the
United States of America."203 As Justice Scalia read that provision, all




Thus, for Justice Scalia, the Ethics Act
197. Id. at 2620. The Court's resolution of the removal issue in Olson follows from the
learning of Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Wiener v. United
States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). See Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2616-19. Indeed, the primary significance
of the Court's decision to uphold the removal restriction was this reaffirmation of Humphrey's
Executor and Wiener against increasingly vigorous challenge by archformalists. See id. at
2635-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 496-501; cf. Miller, supra note
95, at 90-96.
198. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2620 (citation omitted). Nor did the Court find an impermissible
usurpation of executive power by the judiciary. Id. at 2621. Compare In re Sealed Case, 838
F.2d at 507-09, in which the court dismissed the lack-of-aggrandizement argument as "simplis-
tic." Id. at 508.
199. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2621-22.
200. Seven justices joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, with only Justice Scalia dis-
senting. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the decision. Id. at 2622.
201. Id. at 2625 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. Id.
203. U.S. CONsT. art II, § 1, cl. 1.; see Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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must be [invalidated] on fundamental separation-of-powers princi-
ples if the following two questions are answered affirmatively: (1)
Is the conduct of a criminal prosecution (and of an investigation to
decide whether to prosecute) the exercise of purely executive
power? (2) Does the statute deprive the President of the United
States of exclusive control over the exercise of that power?0 5
Justice Scalia emphasized the absolutism of this approach, noting that "it
is ultimately irrelevant how much the statute reduces presidential con-
trol." ' 6 Congress's goal of providing a process to cure the Attorney
General's conflict of interest in investigating senior executive branch offi-
cials matters little in this framework. As Justice Scalia explained, "A
system of separate and coordinate powers necessarily involves an accept-
ance of exclusive power that can theoretically be abused.,
217
Justice Scalia gave archformalism a new voice on the Court, but his
approach was hardly new. Justice Scalia's approach builds on the rheto-
ric in Chadha and Bowsher that insists on strict compartmentalization of
function and independence of action among the branches. Any attempt
by Congress to constrain the power of the President to control the con-
duct of executive power would offend this view. The loneliness of Justice
Scalia's call for an archformalist analysis of the constitutional problems
posed by Congress' provision for independent counsel, however, is new.
III. Olson and the Consolidation of Separation-of-Powers
Methodology
The potential contribution of Olson to separation-of-powers method-
ology appears most clearly in the light of the Court's inability to settle on
a coherent approach to the field. Since the Court's decision in Nixon I,
shifting majorities have advocated irreconcilable approaches to separa-
tion-of-powers disputes. The Court's vacillation between formal and
functional approaches is understandable because both methodologies
have appeal, but neither is entirely satisfactory.
The appeal of functionalism as an approach to the separation of
powers lies in its promise of evolution, allowing adaptation of govern-
mental powers to ,serve the changing requirements of a dynamic soci-
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2628 (emphasis in original). "It is not for us to determine, and we have never
presumed to determine, how much of the purely executive powers of government must be
within the full control of the President. The Constitution prescribes that they all are." Id.
(emphasis in original).
207. Id. at 2629. Justice Scalia also specifically challenged the Court's analysis of the ap-
pointment and removal issues. Id. at 2631-37.
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ety.2°8 A functionalist approach focuses the Court on an instrumentalist
assessment of the anticipated effects of the practice in question, while
minimizing the significance of legal categories.2 °9 The methodology that
has resulted from this functional orientation to judicial decsision making
is, quite naturally, one that stresses the need for determining the public
interest by a pragmatic balancing of those social interests affected by the
resolution of a particular case.210 Although functional balancing often is
linked to judicial activism, it has the opposite effect in a separation-of-
powers context.211 The Court exercises restraint, deferring to the judg-
ment of Congress when the separation question is presented in opera-
tional terms.212
But this adaptability, which is the basis for functionalism's appeal,
ultimately proves disquieting. First, it is not always clear what norma-
tive considerations guide a functional analysis.213 A balancing analysis,
to be legitimate, must proceed according to an agreed upon scale of val-
ues by which to calibrate the costs and benefits of a governmental prac-
tice.214 Yet, a pragmatic approach that focuses the decision making on
the operational effects of a practice tends to frustrate normative debate
by casting the decisive considerations in utilitarian terms. As one com-
mentator has put it, because pragmatic balancing "does not require the
Court to develop and defend a theoretical understanding of a constitu-
tional provision, ' 215 functionalism risks emptiness, because it may lack
208. See Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution
of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 719; Strauss, supra note 30, at 620.
209. See Sargentich, supra note 63, at 439. Functionalism is a product of an instrumental-
ist conception of the legal method, which claims that judges should decide case by selecting
outcomes that further the public good, rather than by reasoning deductively from rules previ-
ously laid down. See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in theAge of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
955-58 (1987).
210. See Aleinikoff, supra note 209, at 958-63.
211. The functional balancing opinions of Schor and Nixon 11 are far more deferential than
the formal opinions of Chadha and Bowsher. Indeed, Justice White, the dissenting voice of
fundtionalism in the latter two cases, criticized his colleagues for decisions that frustrated inno-
vative congressional solutions to modem governmental problems. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 759 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting).
'212. See Carter, supra note 208, at 744-46; Bruff, supra note 47, at 503. Whether judicial
deference to legislative policymaking is appropriate for separation problems is, of course, con-
trbVersial. See Nixon 11, 433 U.S. 425, 506-07 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Olson, 108 S.
Ct. at 2625-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213. See Sargentich, supra note 63, at 440-41.
214. See Aleinikoff, supra note 209, at 972-76.
215. See Aleinikoff, supra note 209, at 988. Functional approaches are not necassarily nor-
matively empty, they simply tend to lapse into utilitarian balancing in practice. For an effort
to rescue pragmatic approaches to constitutional interpretation from that fate, see Farber,
Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
SEPARATION OF POWERS
normative content, or risks deception, because it may mask the values
that actually guide the decision.
The second, related concern raised by functional balancing is the
uncertainty of the precedential value of a judicial decision resulting from
such an analysis. 2 6 Because courts and policy makers cannot know
which factor proved decisive to a court engaged in functional balancing,
they have difficulty discerning limiting principles from the decision. This
difficulty not only undermines the stability of judicial decision making
that the legal system should foster,217 but also risks constitutional values
by eroding constraints on the exercise of governmental power.218
The Court's embrace of formalism as a preferred approach to sepa-
ration problems may be seen as a response to the shortcomings of func-
tionalism. The appeal of formalism is its appeal to constitutionalism. A
formalist Court rejects any claim for deference to government policy-
makers, secure in the belief that the Constitution clearly limits structural
innovation. 219 The formalist would insist that limitations on governmen-
tal power arise from law, not policy.220 Utilitarian arguments concerned
with whether a government practice would achieve a public good thus
have no place in the formalist equation. 22 The formalist judge reads the
Constitution with a belief that its drafters sought to create a government
of independent branches exercising distinctly separated powers.222
Here, formalism runs aground. The Constitution's text usually
proves indeterminate with respect to important, contested separation
questions. 223 Yet the Constitution does not mention the term "separa-
tion of powers," let alone define it.224 Nor does the document attempt to
define the boundaries of the "executive," "legislative," or "judicial" pow-
216. See Carter, supra note 208, at 786-87; Gifford, supra note 88, at 479.
217. See Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
723, 748 (1988); Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595-602 (1987).
218. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 861, 863-64 (1986)
(Brennan, J. dissenting); Nixon 11, 433 U.S. 425, 511-13 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Saphire & Solimine, Shoring Up Article III" Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v.
Schor Era, 68 B.U.L. REv. 85, 120-23 (1988).
219. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 218 (2d ed. 1988).
220. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
944 (1983). The formalist thus feels more confident assuming an activist role than does the
functionalist.
221. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
222. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 721-22; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946, 951.
223. See Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64
B.U.L. REV. 109, 119 (1984); Strauss, supra note 30, at 597-99.
224. See Banks, supra note 31, at 715; Feld, Separation of Political Powers: Boundaries or
Balance?, 21 GA. L. REv. 171, 173 (1986).
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ers of government.225 And if one moves beyond the text, and seeks to
ascertain the "Framers' intent" with sufficient specificity to dictate out-
comes in closely contested cses, the search is equally futile.226 The de-
ductive reasoning of the formalist approach proceeds from premises that
are extremely controversial. Because the constitutional text and history
often remain stubbornly indeterminate, formalistic analysis is unpredict-
able for the same reason that functionalism is: The ingredients of the
225. Professor Rabkin captured this frustrating feature of the Constitution's treatment of
separation of powers: "The Constitution speaks of the 'executive power' and 'the judicial
power' as if their meaning were more or less obvious, drawn from evident or natural models."
Rabkin, The Success of the Separation of Powers and its Contemporary Failings, 1987 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1003, 1005. Yet, as James Madison confessed, the failure of the Constitution to define
the three categories of governmental power is attributable not to a confidence that these defini-
tions were known and shared throughout American society, but to the inability (or unwilling-
ness) of the Framers to offer any such definitions:
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been
able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-
the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the dif-
ferent legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which
prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest
adepts in political science.
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.). The formalist may well re-
spond that the Constitution's explicit allocation of the powers of government to three branches
demonstrates a textual embodiment of the separation principle. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 417, 721-22 (1986); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946, 951 (1983); Sharp, The Classical
American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CH. L. REv. 385, 426-27 (1935). Yet,
even that seemingly innocent statement is contested. See F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO
SECLORUM 258 (1985) ("The doctrine of the separation of powers had clearly been abandoned
in the framing of the Constitution ...."). In any event, suggesting that the Constitution
contemplates a separation of powers "does not take us a step closer to understanding exactly
what is implied or to what degree the branches are to remain separate." Fisher, The Efficiency
Side of Separated Powers, 5 J. AM. STUDIES 113, 131 (1971).
226. The legitimacy of grounding constitutional interpretation on a court's conception of
original intention remains controversial. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 359-69 (1986);
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980);
Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpreta-
tion, " 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985); Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and
the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507 (1988). Even assuming the jurisprudential
appeal of originalism, such an approach to constitutional interpretation is notoriously difficult.
Indeed, a leading historian of the founding period has pronounced the task impossible. See F.
McDONALD, supra note 225, at 224 ("[I]t is meaningless to say that the Framers intended this
or that the Framers intended that: their positions were diverse and, in many particulars, in-
compatible."). Originalist interpretation is haunted not only by deficiencies in the historical
record, see Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Rec-
ord, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1986), but also by evidence that the Framers themselves were not
originalists, see Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985). These difficulties, common to all attempts to use historical materials to define constitu-
tional principle, are exacerbated in the separation-of-powers area because the historical mean-
ing and application of that doctrine is especially elusive. See infra notes 256-317 and
accompanying text.
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decision making may be unknown or unstated.227
In light of the standoff between formal and functional approaches to
separation problems, perhaps the most interesting feature of the Supreme
Court's decision in Olson is that the choice of methodology receives far
less attention than in recent cases. This could prove to be the most im-
portant contribution of Olson to separation-of-powers thinking, signaling
a return to normalcy for this recently hyperactive strand of constitutional
law. First, the Court in Olson gave every indication of abandoning
archformalism as an approach to separation of powers. Because the
archformalist approach is defective both jurisprudentially and histori-
cally, its rejection will serve to clarify separation-of-powers thinking.
Second, the Court did not choose between formal and functional strate-
gies, but rather blended the two into a methodology that promises to
draw on the strengths of each while minimizing their weaknesses. The
resulting consolidation of separation-of-powers methodology suggests an
eclectic style of reasoning that will resolve future disputes with an eye to
both flexibility and principle.
The basis for this change in direction was the Court's rejection of
archformalism as an approach to separation problems. The break with
archformalism in Olson is complete. As Judge Silberman's opinion for
the court of appeals and Justice Scalia's dissent make clear, the
archformalist approach cannot tolerate an Act of Congress allocating an
executive function to the judiciary, or depriving the executive branch of
the power effectively to control the exercise of executive functions. 228
The rejection of archformalism goes beyond outcome: it is reflected
in the style and tone of the Court's opinion in Olson. This aspect of the
debate appears revealingly in the skirmish between Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia criticized the Chief Justice for be-
ginning his analysis with "such relatively technical details as the
Appointments Clause and the removal power,...,"229 instead of offering
a theoretical framework.23 °
For his part, Justice Scalia opened his opinion in traditional
archformalist style, offering an account of the separation of powers as the
227. See Bruff, supra note 47, at 505.
228. See supra notes 152-162, 201-207 and accompanying text.
229. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2625 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
230. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist offered a clue to his reluctance to offer a grand theoretical
conception in an earlier case concerning the separation of powers: "[I]t is doubtless both futile
and perhaps dangerous to find any epigrammatical explanation of how this country has been
governed." Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981).
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"absolutely central guarantee of a just government.12 31 Justice Scalia
then argued that his conclusion flowed principally from the first section
of Article H which vests the executive power "in a President of the
United States." '232 The Ethics Act was inconsistent with that vesting,
and thus void, Justice Scalia reasoned, because it "vests some purely ex-
ecutive power in a person who is not the President of the United States
,,233
Chief Justice Rehnquist gave a direct and pointed response to Jus-
tice Scalia's archformalism. Justice Scalia's "rigid demarcation," the
Chief Justice wrote, "depends upon an extrapolation from general consti-
tutional language which we think is more than the text will bear.
' 234
This curt dismissal of Justice Scalia's alternative formulation of the Olson
issue applies as readily to the archformalist "extrapolations" from text
found in Chadha and Bowsher.
235
The Court's rejection of archformalism in Olson goes beyond rheto-
ric to form the structure of its analysis. One revealing illustration of the
change in approach is found in the Court's rejection of the constitutional
challenge to judicial appointment of independent counsel: after classify-
ing counsel as "inferior" officers within the meaning of the Appointments
Clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that had proved
so persuasive to the court of appeals-that the Appointments Clause did
not authorize interbranch appointments. 236 Although the Court's analy-
sis began in a formal fashion, focusing on the text of the Appointments
Clause, the Framers' intent, and precedent, the manner in which the
Court approached these legal materials distinguishes Olson's approach
from the archformalism of Chadha and Bowsher.
The materials themselves are essentially indeterminate; the text of
the Constitution is silent on the question of interbranch appointments, as
is the historical record of the Framers' consideration of the Appoint-
ments Clause.23 7 For an archformalist, this silence would doom any at-
231. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2622 (Scalia, J., dissenting). With that constitutional stake
claimed, Justice Scalia observed that to describe the archformalist challenge to the independent
counsel process was to decide the case.
232. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I., cl. 1.
233. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 2618 n.29.
235. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 152-162 and accompanying text.
237. Supreme Court precedent on interbranch appointments was not silent. In Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1880), the Court interpreted the Appointments Clause to allow
judicial appointments of election commissioners. In view of the antiquity of that decision and
the sparseness of case law on interbranch apointments before and after Siebold, this precedent
should not constrain a court reviewing the question today in a much different context. See In
tempt by Congress to allocate governmental functions according to a
plan that did not respect the compartmentalization of the branches.2z 8
Chief Justice Rehnquist interpreted these silences permissively, however,
focusing on the constitutional text before him and the history relating to
it. He found that the silence of the Appointments Clause signified that
the text "admits of no limitation on interbranch appointments. 23 9 Simi-
larly, the Framers' silence concerning interbranch appointments under-
mined any implication of such a limitation. The Chief Justice concluded
a brief discussion of the drafting of the Appointments Clause by noting
that "there was little or no debate on the question of whether the Clause
empowers Congress to provide for interbranch appointments, and there




In marked contrast to the archformalist orientation of Chadha and
Bowsher, the Court in Olson indicated that it expected any challenge to
congressional innovations in the governing structure not simply to rest
on a grand theory of separated powers, but to point to specific provisions
in the Constitution, records documenting the Framers' intention, or
precedents that support the challenge. By interpreting constitutional si-
lences permissively, Olson nurtures the flexibility of governmental poli-
cymaking central to the Schor alternative to Chadha-Bowsher formalism.
But, to suggest that the Court has simply replaced the rigidity of
archformalism with the ad hoc functionalism of Schor would be to mis-
read Olson. The Court's embrace of functionalism in Olson, although
real, is incomplete. 41 Unlike the Court's opinions in Nixon II and Schor,
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not introduce his analysis with broad state-
ments suggesting a commitment to pragmatism. 42 He began his opinion
re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 746, 493-94 (D.C. Cir. 1988); infra note 336. Yet, the Court in Olson
was content to observe that "we see no reason now to depart from the holding of Siebold ..
Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2610.
238. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955-58 (1983); In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at
491-96.
239. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2610.
240. Id. at 2611. By contrast, Judge Silberman, writing for the court of appeals, inter-
preted the Framers' silence from the archformalist perspective, concluding:
The delegates to the Convention ... did not even contemplate that the appointments
clause they fashioned permitted Congress to authorize superior officers like depart-
ment heads to appoint inferior officers subordinate to other department heads; still
less did they intend that the courts of law could be empowered to appoint officers in
the Executive Branch who could not, consistent with the separation of powers, be
constitutionally 'inferior' to judges.
In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 492 (emphasis in original).
241. Cf supra text accompanying note 235.
242. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 933, 847-48 (1986);
Nixon II, 433 U.S. 425, 441-43 (1977).
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as a formalist would, by considering the text of the Appointments
Clause.24 3 Nor did the Court in Olson suggest a thoroughly ad hoc bal-
ancing analysis, which has become the norm for those advocating func-
tional approaches to separation problems. 2' Although the Court's
deployment of functionalism proved decisive to the outcome in Olson, it
played only a supporting, role in the Court's analysis. Another look at
Chief Justice Rehnquist's handling of the appointment issue in Olson il-
lustrates the Court's eclectic approach to separation problems.
The Appointments Clause makes clear that the constitutional re-
quirements for appointing inferior officers differ from those for principal
officers. Yet the text does not define the difference between these two
types of officers and, the Court found, "the Framers provided little gui-
dance" on how to draw the distinction.245 Only when these sources
proved unhelpful did the Court resort to a functional analysis to deter-
mine whether independent counsel should be considered inferior or prin-
cipal officers.24 6 The Court also resorted to a functional analysis to close
the discussion of interbranch appointments.247 Again, functionalism
filled a gap left by text, history, and precedent.
The Court's refusal to commit wholly to either formalism or func-
tionalism provides hope that the Justices may yet be able to reach a new
243. The author does not claim here that functionalists ignore the constitutional text in
their separation-of-powers analysis. The author does claim, however, that it is the tendency of
functional analysis to downplay the guidance that the text can offer. In Schor, for example, the
Court opened its separation-of-powers discussion with the text of Article III, but quickly
observed that "the resolution of claims such as Schor's cannot turn on conclusory reference to
the language of Article III." Schor, 478 U.S. at 847. Following that observation, the text
played no part in the Court's analysis. Justice White's practice of beginning his separation
opinions with claims of the pragmatic importance of the government practices under challenge
is equally revealing. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)
(describing Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act as "one of the most novel and far-reaching legisla-
tive responses to a national crisis since the New Deal"); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967
(1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("The prominence of the legislative veto mechanism in our con-
temporary political system and its importance to Congress can hardly be overstated.").
244. See supra notes 24-45 and 208-218 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia's charges
that the Court in Olson did adopt such a thoroughgoing balancing test are misplaced. See
Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2629-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2608. The Court found precedent suggesting an appropriate line
between principal and inferior officers, but the cases were few and not determinative. Id. at
2609.
246. See supra notes 173-176 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia rejected the Court's
resort to functionalism at this juncture, arguing that use of the word "inferior" in the Appoint-
ments Clause dictated the conclusion that an independent counsel did not qualify for that
status. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2633 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia relied on the secondary
meaning attributed to the word "inferior" in "[d]ictionaries in use at the time of the Constitu-
tional Convention," id., and on several uses of the word "inferior" in other contexts found in
the historical record. Id. at 2634.
247. See supra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
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consensus. An eclectic approach, drawing on the strengths of both strat-
egies, offers a more stable solution. The Court's decision to start for-
mally, with text and history, is appropriate. By allowing the text at issue
to channel its consideration, the Court helps secure the legitimacy of its
decision. This orientation also helps to draw out the normative consider-
ations that should inform the Court's judgment by turning the discussion
toward the purposes and values served by the constitutional limitations
implicated by a challenged government practice. This textual anchoring
helps produce an opinion that reflects more than the personal policy pref-
erences of the Justices. An openness to formalism-a preference for de-
cision by rule-can produce such useful linedrawing as the demiformalist
principle of Chadha (namely, that Congress may not provide itself a for-
mal role in the administration of government).
At the same time, the Court in Olson avoided the hazards that usu-
ally attend a formalist approach to judicial problem solving by candidly
admitting the limits of formalism's usefulness. When text, history, and
precedent are exhausted, a formalist attempt to pursue deductive reason-
ing collapses. Implicit in the Court's move to functionalism is the reali-
zation that text and history, while providing useful moorings, ultimately
will determine few outcomes in separation-of-powers disputes. The role
of functionalist analysis in the Olson system, then, is to guide the Court
to its ultimate decision within the constraints of rules drawn from formal
legal materials.24
The Court's eclectic methodology in Olson is hardly a novel ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation.249 Yet, remarkably, it is new to
Supreme Court decision making in the separation-of powers field. Escap-
ing preoccupation with the perceived need to choose between formalism
and functionalism, the Olson Court's approach could signal a return to
normalcy. Olson eclecticism, needless to say, does not guarantee correct
outcomes. Nor does it prescribe a detailed approach that regiments fu-
248. The Supreme Court's synthesis of formal and functional approaches in Olson is prefer-
able to that suggested by Judge Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion in the court of appeals. See
supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text. The eclectic approach finds a place for formal
and functional analysis in each decision. Though the relative weight accorded to each would
vary from case to case, the Court would be required to justify each of its decisions formally and
functionally. By contrast, Judge Ginsburg would divide separation cases into two tiers-those
that are analyzed formalistically and those that are analyzed functionally. In practice, Judge
Ginsburg's division would likely prove largely outcome determinative. In addition, the two-
tier methodology would continue the tendency of analyzing separation cases either formalisti-
cally or functionally and thus would suffer from the deficiencies of purely formal and func-
tional analyses.
249. See P. BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3-8 (1982)i Fallon, A Constructivist Coher-
ence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987); Far-
ber, supra note 215.
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ture analyses along predetermined lines. But it does offer a flexible orien-
tation that would encourage the Court to treat separation problems as
exercises in constitutional interpretation, and to use all of the tools cus-
tomarily accepted as part of that enterprise.
Implicit in the recent separation-of-powers debate is the notion that
the separation concept differs from other constitutional concepts and
should be approached differently. Separation of powers does come to us
with a unique and intriguing history. It is fairly safe to say, however,
that this does not distinguish separation from other core constitutional
concepts. Indeed, the historical development of American commitment
to separation of powers suggests a closer fit with the eclecticism of Olson
than with a commitment to either pure formalism or pure functionalism.
The Court's balancing of formal and functional strategies parallels the
Framers' decision to blend the political theories of separated powers and
checks and balances.
IV. Olson Eclecticism and Lessons from History
Since at least the founding of this nation, paradox has haunted the
American embrace of separation of powers. Although adherence to the
idea of separation of powers has been steadfast, adherents have disagreed
considerably over the meaning of separation of powers and its implica-
tions for the structure of government.25 ° This discord has two primary,
related causes. The first cause is tied to the linguistic similarities between
separation of powers and older political theories concerning the optimal
structure of government, such as mixed government and checks and bal-
ances.251 Those similarities are more beguiling than real,252 with the re-
sult that many speak of separation of powers when they are describing a
different theory.
The second cause of theoretical disharmony also results from the
elasticity of the term "separation of powers," but in a different sense.
Separation of powers embraces more than a single idea; it includes "a
cluster of concepts that have to be distinguished." '253 This lack of a clear
definition has allowed the meaning of separation of powers to change
over time, as political thinkers and actors with differing views used sepa-
250. See Erler, The Constitution and the Separation of Powers, in THE FRAMING AND RAT-
IFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 151, 151 (L. Levy & D. Mahoney eds. 1987); Gywn, The
Separation of Powers and Modern Forms of Democratic Government, in SEPARATION OF POW-
ERs-DoEs IT STILL WORK? 65, 71 (R. Goldwin & A. Kaufman eds. 1986).
251. See G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 97 (1981).
252. See infra notes 256-317 and accompanying text.
253. G. WILLS, supra note 251, at 109; see G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 151 (1969).
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Snrine 19891 SEPARATION OF POWERSration theory for different purposes.254 As a result, separation of powers
ration theory for different purposes . 2 5 ' As a result, separation of powers
offers anything but a "pure norm."2 55
A. Historical Origins of Separation Theory
Although it is unrealistic to expect that history will yield a compre-
hensive rule of decision,256 the origins of separation theory offer insight
into the values that the theory was designed to advance and the conse-
quences it was intended to evoke.257 The legitimacy of a contemporary
judicial methodology for separation problems depends, at least in part,
on the degree to which it respects the values and concerns of those who
laid out our structure of government. Though expectations must be
modest, a consideration of the "confused origin" 258 of separation think-
ing considerably aids an evaluation of the relative merits of formal, func-
tional, and eclectic approaches to the separation of powers.
The origins of separation-of-powers theory can be traced to antiq-
uity,2 5 9 but one must be careful when assessing that lineage. The polit-
ical theory of Aristotle, for example, separated those who exercise the
functions of government into three categories: deliberators, magistrates,
254. See G. WOOD, supra note 253, at 152-53, 547-53; Sharp, supra note 225, at 434-35.
W. B. Gwyn, in his leading historical study of separation of powers, set forth five versions of
the theory that had been articulated over time. See generally W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965). Professor Gwyn recently has offered a concise sum-
mary of the versions of separation theory he has identified. See Gwyn, supra note 250, at 68-
70.
255. See G. WILLS, supra note 251, at 109. In his important treatment of the historical
development of the concept of separation of powers, M.J.C. Vile identified and defined a "pure
doctrine" of the separation of powers. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEP-
ARATION OF POWERS 13 (1967). Professor Vile emphasized that political thinkers and actors
consistently have rejected separation in its pure form. Id. at 3.
The phenomenon of widespread belief in a political idea coexisting with disagreement on
the meaning of that idea was common during the founding period. See F. MCDONALD, supra
note 225, at 4-5, 10-13. Professor McDonald, for example, has observed that "for two decades
prior to the meeting of the Constitutional Convention, American political discourse was an
ongoing public forum on the meaning of liberty. And there was a wide range of opinion:
almost the only thing generally agreed upon was that everybody wanted it." Id. at 10. The
recurring phenomenon that Professor McDonald describes should not be surprising, given
"the persistence of diversity in American patterns of thought and behavior during the colonial
and early national periods." Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republi-
canism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HisT. 9, 11 (1988). For an
interesting synthesis of the intellectual and cultural patterns that shaped American thought
during the founding period, see id.
256. See W.B. GWYN, supra note 254, at 128; Strauss, supra note 1, at 511-12.
257. See Levi, supra note 6, at 372.
258. See Sharp, supra note 225, at 407.
259. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 2-3; Sharp, supra note 225, at 386-87.
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and judicial actors.2 60 This division resembles our separation of govern-
mental powers among legislators, executives, and judges. But the Aris-
totelean conception differs from separation-of-powers theory. Unlike the
latter theory, Aristotle's division is descriptive rather than normative.26'
More fundamentally, Aristotelean theory did not speak to the central
feature of separation of powers, the entrustment of each government
function to a distinct branch of government.262 This is because Aris-
totle's division flowed from a theory of mixed government, not from one
of separated powers.263
The theory of mixed government is "complicated and comprehen-
sive,"'264 relating ancient forms of government to class divisions perceived
within society. Mixed theory combines the three classical types of gov-
ernment-monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy-in one system, at-
tempting to draw on the desirable features of each while minimizing their
dangers. 265 This achievement is attributed to the capacity of mixed the-
ory to offer major interests in society a share in governance.266 The ap-
peal of this power sharing was the prospect of balanced, moderate
government, achieved by a structure that denied to any societal interest
260. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 22; Sharp, supra note 225, at 387. Perhaps this
accounts for western political theorists' "almost mystical habit of thinking in threes." See F.
McDonald, supra note 225, at 80.
261. See Sharp, supra note 225, at 387. As Professor Sharp explained, Aristotle offered no
rationale for his division of government: "it is apparently not even thought of as a condition
which 'ought' to obtain." Id. Yet, as Professor Gwyn has maintained, separation theory is
distinctly normative, claiming achievement of "extremely valuable ends." See W. B. GWYN,
supra note 254, at 9.
262. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 22.
263. See id. at 23; Sharp, supra note 225, at 386-87.
264. G. WOOD, supra note 253, at 199.
265. Id. at 197-98. Professor Wood has captured this spirit of mixed theory:
Each of these simple forms possessed a certain quality of excellence: for monarchy, it
was order or energy; for aristocracy, it was wisdom; and for democracy, it was hon-
esty or goodness . . . .Yet men being what they were, experience had tragically
taught that none of these simple forms of government by itself could remain stable.
Left alone each ran headlong into perversion in the eager search by the rulers,
whether one, few, or many, for more power. Monarchy lunged toward its extremity
and ended in a cruel despotism. Aristocracy, located midway on the band of power,
pulled in both directions and created "faction and multiplied usurpation." Democ-
racy, seeking more power in the hands of the people, degenerated into anarchy and
tumult. The mixed or balanced polity was designed to prevent these perversions. By
including each of the classic simple forms of government in the same constitution,
political fluctuations would cease. The forces pulling in one direction would be coun-
terbalanced by opposing forces .... Only through this reciprocal sharing of political
power by the one, the few, and the many, could the desirable qualities of each be
preserved.
Id. at 198.
266. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 23, 33.
the power to dominate the others.2 67
At this level of aspiration, theories of mixed government and sepa-
rated powers converge. Separation theory, with its diffusion of govern-
mental powers, seeks societal stability by requiring broad consensus
among decisionmakers as a prerequisite for government action.268
Mixed-governmental theory nevertheless remains fundamentally distinct
from separation-of-powers theory with respect to its structural premises
and the means used to achieve stable government. Mixed theory divides
power by class interests, not by function.2 6 9 In fact, mixed theory seeks
balance by assuring each class interest a role with respect to each govern-
ment function. 270 Because the goal of this theory is to hav e each part of
government share in each of the functions of government, mixed theory
leads government structure away from a separation of powers and to-
ward a blending of governmental powers.271
Mixed theory enjoyed widespread acceptance in western culture
long before the emergence of separated powers theory, having gained a
measure of acceptance in medieval Europe.272 Mixed government domi-
nated English political theory273 because it accommodated English social
class arrangements and provided representation for each of the country's
three estates: royalty, represented by the Crown; nobility, represented by
the House of Lords; and the commons, represented by the House of
Commons. American colonists respected England's mixed constitution
for its capacity to balance the divisions within English society.27 4
Americans accepted the premise of mixed theory-that the ideal ar-
rangement of governmental institutions must balance the contending
267. Id at 33. The value Plato placed on moderation and compromise by governmental
actors informed ancient mixed theory. Id. at 35.
268. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421, 430-37
(1987).
269. See G. WOOD, supra note 253, at 150-52; Ceaser, In Defense of Separation of Powers,
in SEPARATION OF POWERs-DoEs IT STILL WORK? 168, 184 (R. Goldwin & A. Kaufman
eds. 1986).
270. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 33; G. WILLS, supra note 251, at 99-100.
271. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 36. Professor Wills has captured the ultimate
irreconcilability of mixed theory and separation theory with the following observation:
Thus mixed government is not only different from the later concept of separated
powers; it is at odds with it. The ideal of mixed government is harmonic fusion, not
division. One distinct function does not "check" another equally distinct function.
Rather, all the interests should "have a say" on all the issues.
G. WILLS, supra note 251, at 100.
272. See Carter, supra note 208, at 769. By contrast, separation theory did not emerge
until the middle of the seventeenth century. See infra notes 281-282 and accompanying text.
273. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 70-71
(1967).
274. See id. at 70, 273.
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forces in society so that none may control the others.2 7 5 The American
attraction to mixed theory was more reflexive than reflective.276 The for-
mal class structure that provided the social context for the mixed govern-
ment of England was absent in American life and anathema to emerging
American political theory.27 7 Mixed theory has little place in a govern-
ment premised on popular sovereignty.278
American thinkers and policymakers of the Revolutionary War era
experimented with separation of powers as a replacement for mixed gov-
ernment.279 That Americans turned to separation theory is not surpris-
ing: the concept of separated powers was first articulated as a coherent
theory during the English Civil War of the mid-seventeenth century.28
After abolishing the monarchy and the House of Lords, English radicals
of the time sought a device to moderate a government in which the
crown and the nobility would not perform distinct roles.281 Their con-
cern was that popular control of Parliament would result in "mob
rule."'2 82 Separation of powers developed as a way of moderating democ-
racy by assigning important functions to branches of government other
than the legislature.283
Furthermore, separation theory promised to moderate democracy in
a manner consonant with the values of the revolution. Unlike mixed the-
ory, it divided government power by function, not by class interest.
284
275. B. BAILYN, supra note 273, at 273.
276. See id. at 273-80; H.S. COMMAGER, THE EMPIRE OF REASON 203-04 (1977); F. Mc-
DONALD, supra note 225, at 209-13. In addition, a reverence for English constitutionalism
was in considerable tension with colonial grievances against England for alleged highhanded-
ness. See H.S. COMMAGER, supra, at 204-05.
277. See H.S. COMMAGER, supra note 276, at 203-09; Erler, supra note 250, at 154. Unde-
niably, interests competed for influence within early American society and those interests were
grounded, at least in part, on class divisions. The important point distinguishing American
political theory from the English model of that time is that Americans did not wish to institu-
tionalize such divisions, but instead searched for a governing structure that would reconcile
conflicting interests. See B. BAILYN, supra note 273, at 299-300; H.S. COMMAGER, supra note
276, at 205; THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
278. See H.S. COMMAGER, supra note 276, at 203-04. Professor Vile has noted the improb-
ability of a society maintaining its adherence to mixed theory when democratic movements
dominate the culture. M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 34.
279. See B. BAILYN, supra note 273, at 280-301; G. WOOD, supra note 253, 602-06.
280. See W.B. GWYN, supra note 254, at 68; M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 3, 32-34; G.
WOOD, supra note 253, at 151.
281. See G. WOOD, supra note 253, at 151.
282. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 43.
283. See id. at 42-43.
284. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 33-34. English adherence to separation theory
proved temporary. With the Restoration, the social context for mixed theory returned, and
with it, mixed government. Id. at 34, 51. Though eclipsed in England, separation theory did
not disappear. It became a part of western constitutionalism, but was not dominant until the
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Thus, separation of powers held irresistible appeal for Americans, for it
offered to protect individual liberty by moderating governmental action
in a social context devoid of formal class arrangements.
It is far easier to document revolutionary America's acceptance of
the idea of separation of powers-the idea that the powers of government
should be separated by function among three departments-than it is to
understand the meaning of "separation" at the time.2"5 Americans ac-
cepted a "rigid" '286 form of separation of powers in theory, but not in
practice.287 Many state constitutions framed during the revolutionary
period explicitly adopted separation of powers as a norm of governmen-
tal structure, but in operation did not hold to any real division of govern-
mental functions.28 8 As a result, legislatures emerged as the dominant
branch of government.28 9
Dissatisfaction with the patterns of governance within the states, as
well as the perceived failure of the single-branch national government
constituted by the Articles of Confederation, led a number of American
leaders to reconsider their approach to government structure. 290 Ameri-
cans were divided. Some sought to restore balance to American govern-
ment by advocating a "pure" '291 approach to the separation of powers. A
"pure" theory of separation divides government into legislature, execu-
tive, and judiciary, and assigns to each the respective functions of govern-
ment-legislative, executive, or judicial. The separation prescribed by
the pure theory is complete: each branch of government is confined
American Revolution. See W.B. GWYN, supra note 254, at 51-52, 68, 82-85, 89-90; M.J.C.
VILE, supra note 255, at 34, 51.
285. See G. WOOD, supra note 253, at 150-54.
286. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 132.
287. See H.S. COMMAGER, supra note 276, at 213-14; G. WOOD, supra note 253, at 153-54.
288. G. WOOD, supra note 253, at 153-54. All of the revolutionary consitutions reflected
separation doctrine; six explicitly endorsed it. F. McDONALD, supra note 225, at 84. For an
account of the provision of separated powers by the revolutionary constitutions, see M.J.C.
VILE, supra note 255, at 133-43. For an assessment of the influence of state constitution mak-
ing on the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, see Williams, "Experience Must Be Our Only
Guide"." The State Constitutional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15
HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403 (1988).
289. See G. WOOD, supra note 253, at 154-56. Professor Commager has explained the
development of legislative supremacy in early state governments by noting the "[h]ostility to
executive power-so easily associated with royal power-was deep and pervasive, and to most
Americans self-government meant government by elected representatives." H.S. COMMAGER,
supra note 276, at 214. Professor Wood notes that "[w]hen Americans in 1776 spoke of keep-
ing the several parts of the government separate and distinct, they were primarily thinking of
insulating the judiciary and particularly the legislature from executive manipulation." G.
WooD, supra note 253, at 157.
290. Erler, supra note 250, at 158; G. WOOD, supra note 253, at 474-75.
291. This description is taken from Professor Vile. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 13.
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strictly to the exercise of its own function and is not allowed to encroach
on the functions of the others.292 Each branch checks the others,
preventing any one group from controlling the machinery of
government.293
The pure approach to separation of powers attracted adherents
among the delegates to the Constitutional Convention 294 and, most strik-
ingly, among the Antifederalist resistance to ratification of the Constitu-
tion.295 Yet a pure approach to separation of powers remained
unconvincing to most Federalists.296 In fact, such an approach has been
adopted only rarely by nation builders.297
The pure theory is vulnerable to two criticisms. The first charges
that a rigid separation of governmental functions produces an inefficient,
perhaps unworkable, government.298 This criticism undercuts the earli-
est rationale for separating powers, the promotion of efficiency in govern-
ment.299 The Framers sought a government that was efficient as well as
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See Fisher, supra note 225, at 129-30. Professor McDonald has noted that "republi-
can ideologues" at the Constitutional Convention espoused "the complete separation of the
three departments of government, both in function and in personnel .... " F. McDONALD,
supra note 225, at 202. But, the argument for purity was not confined to "republican ideo-
logues." James Wilson, a leading nationalist at the Convention, advocated a doctrinaire ap-
proach to separation that opposed the blending of powers among the branches. See Sharp,
supra note 225, at 411-14.
295. A staple of the Antifederalist challenge to the Constitution was the charge that the
document allowed an inappropriate degree of blending of power among the branches of the
national government. See G. WOOD, supra note 253, at 548; Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The
Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, in THE CONFEDERATION AND
THE CONSTITUTION 56, 70-71, 84 (G. Wood ed. 1979); Sharp, supra note 225, at 427-34.
Professor Kenyon underscored the antifederalist advocacy of pure separation by quoting from
"an obscure member of the Virginia Convention":
That the legislature, executive, and judicial powers should be separate and distinct, in
all free governments, is a political fact so well established, that I presume I shall not
be thought arrogant, when I affirm that no country ever did, or ever can, long remain
free, where they are blended. All the states have been in this sentiment when they
formed their state constitutions, and therefore have guarded against the danger; and
every schoolboy in politics must be convinced of the propriety of the observation; and
yet, by the proposed plan, the legislative and executive powers are closely united ....
Id. at 70.
296. G. WOOD, supra note 253, at 547-53.; Erler, supra note 250, at 155-60; Gwyn, supra
note 250, at 70.
297. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 13.
298. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 316 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.) (noting "the im-
possibility and inexpediency of.avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments"); H. S.
COMMAGER, supra note 276, at 216; Fisher, supra note 225, at 116-29.
299. See W.B. GWYN, supra note 254, at 32-33. Professor Gwyn summarized the "effi-
ciency version" of separation of powers as follows:
The efficiency version was based on the assumption that, to preserve liberty and the
public interest, a large representative assembly was required to make or consent to
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stable, 3" an aspiration that would have been frustrated by a pure ap-
proach to separated powers.
The second criticism of pure separation is more subtle, but more
devastating than the efficiency argument. This criticism challenges the
central normative claim of the pure approach, that complete separation
among governmental power centers is necessary to ensure individual lib-
erty.3 ° I In this view, the flaw of pure separation is that it relies on
"parchment barriers" to maintain separation when much more is needed
to control "the encroaching spirit of power."3 °2 Thus, while the Framers
sought an approach to constitutionalism that would offer "that happy
mean which.., combines the energy of government with the security of
private rights,"303 a pure theory of separation could promise neither.
Nevertheless, the Framers did not abandon separation of powers as
an ideal for government structure. Madison challenged the pure theory
of separation of powers, but not the idea of separation itself. Though
legislation. It was then argued that such an assembly because of its very size could
not execute the laws with necessary "secrecy and dispatch" and that a much smaller
organization was therefore required to perform the executive function. This version
of the doctrine was initially popular in England during the mid-seventeenth century,
when the Long Parliament attempted to exercise executive functions, and flourished
again for the same reason in North America among such critics of government under
the Articles of Confederation as John Adams, John Jay, Thomas Jefferson, James
Madison, George Washington, and James Wilson.
Gwyn, supra note 250, at 70.
300. See D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 146 (1984); Erler,
supra note 250, at 151.
301. Professor Vile captured the normative claim of pure separation theory with the fol-
lowing description: "It is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political liberty
that the government be divided into three branches or departments, the legislature, the execu-
tive, and the judiciary." M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 13. The political theory underlying
the Constitution, however, rejected the view that a complete separation of powers was neces-
sary to protect liberty. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 314-15 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.);
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 321 (J. Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 429 (A.
Hamilton).
302. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 321 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.). In leveling this
charge, Madison recalled the disappointing experience of state constitutions that had articu-
lated a pure theory of separation:
After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as they
may in their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult
task is to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others.
What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved.
Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these depart-
ments, in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barri-
ers against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which appears to
have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American constitu-
tions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly
overrated; and that some more adequate defence is indispensably necessary for the
more feeble, against the more powerful, members of the government.
Id. at 321-22.
303. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 159 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed.).
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skeptical of the possibility of distinguishing among the three functions of
government in every case,3° he did not deny the distinctiveness of each
power or the general desirability of keeping the powers "separate and
distinct. ' 30  Most significantly, Madison rejected complete separation in
favor of a partial blending of power in order to save "the degree of sepa-
ration ... essential to a free government .... ,306 The Framers believed
that separation of powers could promote efficiency in government while
safeguarding liberty,307 but in place of the pure conception of separation
doctrine, the Framers combined separation theory with the theory of
checks and balances.30 8
In a system of checks and balances, each branch of government has
power directly to control actions of the other branches. Thus, each
branch has a role, albeit a limited one, in the exercise of each of the other
branches' functions.30 9 Checks and balances is at odds with separation of
powers: it promotes stability and discourages arbitrary rule by requiring
the participation of different branches before the state acts, not by requir-
ing their separation.310 With its emphasis on "collective decisionmak-
ing,' ' 31 1 checks and balances is best seen as a derivation of mixed theory,
not separation of powers.312
The Framers did not use checks and balances to obliterate separa-
tion of powers, but to modify it-indeed, to preserve it.313 In the Ameri-
can system, checks and balances plays a necessary role, but one
necessarily subordinate to separation theory.314 Checks and balances
304. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.).
305. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 312 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.). Madison de-
scribed separation as an "essential precaution in favor of liberty." Id.
306. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 321 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.).
307. See Gwyn, supra note 250, at 66; Sharp, supra note 225, at 434; Strauss, supra note 30,
'at 602.
308. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 34; Gwyn, supra note 250, at 74; Kurland, The
Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REv. 592, 593 (1986).
309. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 18.
310. See id.
311. The phrase is taken from Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40
VAND. L. REV. 389, 405 (1987).
312. See G. WILLS, supra note 251, at 119. Professor Vile has described checks and bal-
ances as "the old theory of mixed government stripped of its class connotations." M.J.C.
VILE, supra note 255, at 34.
313. Those who argue that the Framers rejected separation of powers, see F. McDONALD,
supra note 225, at 258; Sunstein, supra note 268, at 430, overstate the impactlof checks and
balances on American constitutionalism. See infra notes 314-317 and accompanying text.
Perhaps these observations are best understood as emphasizing that the role of checks and
'balances in the prevailing political theory signals the Framers' rejection of pure separation
theory. See supra notes 221-300 and accompanying text.
314. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 34.
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preserve "the degree of separation which the [separation] maxim requires
.... ,315 The mixture of governmental powers it prescribes is limited, so
that the core idea of a division of governmental functions remains.316
This blending of political theories produced a "partial" '317 separation of
governmental functions, not a thorough mixture.
B. The Evolution of Separation Theory and Eclecticism
The merging of separation of powers with checks and balances pro-
duces a doctrine shrouded by paradox.318 Merging also contributes to
the confusion of methodology that haunts contemporary separation-of-
powers decision making. The conflict between separation and mixture of
powers, as well as the imprecise resolution of the tensions they produce,
has fueled the struggle between formalists and functionalists.
Within this struggle, the archformalist is the ideological descendant
of the Antifederalist, seeking the purest form of separation of powers
obtainable under the Constitution. As is true of one who subscribes to
the pure version of separation of powers, archformalists insist that any
government action can be classified as either legislative, executive, or ju-
dicial.31 9 With this insistence comes the prescription that each branch
remain "separate and wholly independent" when exercising its assigned
function.32 The archformalist embrace of pure separation theory is tem-
pered by an acknowledgement that the Constitution provides for power-
sharing under certain circumstances. But the archformalist sees those
provisions as limited incursions on the pure separation model, refusing to
imply power-sharing provisions when there is no explicit textual com-
mand.321 Indeed, as illustrated by the opinions of Judge Silberman and
Justice Scalia in Olson, archformalists hesitate to follow the soundings of
315. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 321 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.). See D. EPSTEIN,
supra note 300, at 137-38; M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 153.
316. See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 300, at 131; M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 18. Madison
emphasized the need to preserve the separation of powers by limiting their mixture:
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments
ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other depart-
ments. It is equally evident, that none of them ought to possess, directly or indi-
rectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their
respective powers.
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 321 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.).
317. See Gwyn, supra note 250, at 74; M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 18.
318. See Levi, supra note 6, at 379.
319. Compare M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 16 with I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951
(1983).
320. Compare M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 17 with Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722
(1986).
321. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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constitutional text if they lead toward an arrangement inconsistent with
the pure model.322 By doing so, they cling to an idealized notion of sym-
metry in governmental organization that the Framers consciously
abandoned.
Since the Framers' rejection of the pure model of separated powers,
functionalists have tended to deny the normative attraction of separation,
turning instead to the ideal of checks and balances.323 This position,
however, is an overextension of the Madisonian challenge to separation
theory. For Madison, checks and balances were not a substitute for sepa-
ration of powers, but rather a subordinate component in a system
designed to achieve separated powers.324 Checks and balances are an
undeniably important feature of American constitutionalism and, for
that matter, functionalism has a prominent role in the resolution of struc-
tural issues. But functionalism, with its appeal to checks and balances,
cannot offer a complete solution to separation problems.
The Framers' effort to maintain a separation of powers, albeit in
adulterated form, suggests a role for formalism in resolving issues con-
cerning the division of governmental powers. Formalism, with its re-
spect for the prescriptive power of legal categories, fits the concept of
separating powers among governmental actors. 325 More fundamentally,
providing a role for formalism in separation analysis as a counterweight
to functionalism fits the merger of separation and balancing theories re-
flected in the Constitution.
A blending of formalist and functional strategies, like the combina-
tion of separation of powers with checks and balances, offers a solution
to dilemmas that have plagued contemporary separation methodology:
facilitating effective government while maintaining safe government, and
providing "practical security" 326 for the system in a principled manner.
Such a combination also helps secure the judicial role suggested by
Madison's rejection of a proposal that separation problems be resolved
by "the people" in popular convention.327 Madison's "greatest objec-
tion ' 328 to such a decision making process was that "[t]he passions,...
not the reason, of the public would sit in judgment" of these structural
322. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
323. See Sargentich, supra note 63, at 433.
324. See supra notes 310-315 and accompanying text.
325. See Sargentich, supra note 63, at 433.
326. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 321 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.).
327. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.). The proposal was by
Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 328-330.
328. Id. at 330.
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issues.3 29 In effect, Madison argued that the popular will is not an appro-
priate measure of the constitutional legitimacy of assertions of power by
the branches of government. In the contemporary setting, Madison's
view supports a judicial role in resolving separation disputes. This role
reflects deep ambivalence: although "parchment barriers" are ineffective
measures of "practical security" for the governing structure, judicial en-
forcement of constitutional norms is required if separation disputes are to
be resolved by reasoned judgment on their "true merits."
The enigmatic quality of separation theory does not dissolve on in-
spection, it deepens. A historical understanding of separation of powers
gives rise to a realization that history does not provide reliable answers to
important questions concerning the governing structure, as the
archformalists claim. It is simply unrealistic to expect separation theory,
especially when combined with a system of checks and balances, to pro-
vide a principle sufficiently concrete to decide discrete cases.33° Yet, a
sense of history does help in understanding the values and political theo-
ries that the Framers ultimately constitutionalized.
An understanding of separation theory's historical development also
enables one to appreciate the wisdom of Olson eclecticism. In Olson, the
Court mediated the choice between formalism and functionalism in
much the same way the Framers merged separation-of-powers and
checks and balances. The formalist and functionalist approaches to sepa-
ration of powers are both incomplete, each focusing on one strand of
separation theory and ignoring the imperatives of the other. The Fram-
ers' decision to blend separation-of-powers theory with checks and bal-
ances suggests that the Constitution does not reflect a choice between
those competing ideas, but incorporates complementary aspects of each.
The Olson Court focused on constitutional text and the Framers' intent,
as would the formalist, but when those legal sources proved insufficient,
the Court used functional analysis to resolve the separation problem.
The supporting role of functionalism in the Court's decisional process
matches the role the Framers assigned to the idea of checks and balances
in the Constitution. The tension between the Court's formalist and func-
tionalist sympathies were resolved in Olson by using an integrated, eclec-
tic approach. This eclectic approach is consistent with the historical
development of separation theory.
329. Id. at 331. Madison explained that "reason, alone, of the public.., ought to control
and regulate the government." Id. To Madison, a reasoned response to separation problems
by a popular convention would be most unlikely, because "it could never be expected to turn
on the true merits of the question. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit of preexist-
ing parties, or of parties springing out of the question itself." Id.
330. See W. B. GWYN, supra note 254, at 128.
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V. Olson Eclecticism Revisited
If there is any noncontroversial conclusion to be drawn from the
historical development of separation theory, it is that the structure the
Framers finally selected reflects profound and contested value choices.
Interpretation of constitutional provisions reflecting those choices is in-
complete without an account of how the "meaning" derived from the
text fits a conception of how the governing structure should operate.331
As a thoughtful commentator has trenchantly observed, "[t]he text of the
Constitution is not, by itself, going to provide answers to hard constitu-
tional questions, and anyone with any sense knows that." '332 That re-
minder is especially relevant to separation of powers. The constitutional
text does not articulate a separation-of-powers principle, and its elabora-
tion of the governing structure is, at best, suggestive of outcomes in con-
tested cases.333
Viewed in this light, the Court's opinion in Olson, a hotly contested
case, is striking for its lack of normative justification. Congress' effort to
vest the power to appoint independent counsel in the Special Division
and to restrict the executive's power to remove counsel for cause are cor-
nerstones of the Ethics Act's provisions for independent investigation
and prosecution of executive misconduct. But even in the face of this
interbranch power struggle, the Court's functional analysis was norma-
tively empty. For example, the Chief Justice held that Congress lacked
power under the Appointments Clause to authorize courts to appoint
officials serving in other branches if the duties of those officials were in-
congruent with the functions normally performed by courts.334 The
Court, however, offered no explanation of why such an incongruity
should constitute a limiting standard. This failure was all the more
troubling for Chief Justice Rehnquist's acknowledgement that the text of
the Appointments Clause "admits of no limitation on interbranch ap-
pointments" 335 and that the history of the clause "provides no sup-
port ' 3 36 for such a limitation. In this light, the Chief Justice's statement
that the limitation was "suggested" by language in an antique decision of
331. See Shane, Conventionalism in Constitutional Interpretation and the Place of Adminis-
trative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 573, 583 & n.55 (1987). ("Without some preconception of
what the interbranch relationship should be, the text cannot be interpreted.").
332. Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL L. REV. 399, 439 (1985).
333. See supra notes 225-229 and accompanying text.
334. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (1988).




the Supreme Court is hardly a convincing justification.33 7
More fundamentally, the Court in Olson failed to provide a norma-
tive rationale for its conclusion that the good-cause restriction on the
Attorney General's power to remove the independent counsel did not
"unduly trammel on executive authority. '33' The Court's explanation
was decidedly pragmatic. The Court did not "see how the President's
need to control the exercise of [the independent counsel's] discretion is so
central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a mat-
ter of constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the
President. ' 339 Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on his finding that the in-
dependent counsel is an "inferior officer." 3'4 The Court never explained
why, in light of the value choices that inhere in the structure of constitu-
tional governance, it was acceptable or desirable for Congress to provide
for an independent counsel. To say, as a functional matter, that the Pres-
idency can live with the Ethics Act is not to say, as a normative matter,
that it should do so.
This lack of normative content in the Court's legitimation of the
Ethics Act drew Justice Scalia's most telling criticisms of the majority
opinion. Justice Scalia's claim that the majority ultimately resolved the
difficult separation issues posed by the independent counsel provision by
assertion, rather than justification, rings true.34 1 The Court's judgment
reflects the Justices' comfort level with the independent counsel arrange-
ment.342  To say that a majority of the Justices see no "need" for in-
creased executive control does not resolve the constitutional issues
presented. The incorporation of a normative dimension in the Court's
functional analysis would complete the eclecticism of Olson's recon-
structed separation-of-powers methodology. Adding a normative com-
ponent would contribute to the legitimacy of the Court's judgment by
shifting the focus of decision from purely utilitarian grounds to an assess-
ment of the fit between the government practice at issue and the values
served by the relevant constitutional provisions.
337. Id. at 2611. The case the Court relied on was Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398
(1880). Because courts exercise a good deal of discretion in evaluating precedent, especially
one as old as Siebold, it would be simplistic to claim that the Court in Olson was bound by the
language in Siebold. See Fallon, supra note 249, at 1202-04. For recent, sophisticated ac-
counts of the prescriptive power of precedent, see Monaghan, supra note 217; Schauer, supra
note 217.
338. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See id. at 2629-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
342. Id. at 2641.
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A normative case may be made for the constitutionality of the in-
dependent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act. The justification for an
independent counsel arises from the apparent conflict of interest that at-
tends any investigation or prosecution by the Justice Department of se-
nior officials of the executive branch.343 To allow the Justice Department
to proceed in such a setting clashes with the tenet of American constitu-
tionalism holding that no person may judge his or her own cause.3
4
This proposition is based partly on the psychological observation that
"partiality to oneself and the groups with which one identifies oneself
occurs so frequently in human experience that it would be foolish to ig-
nore it in arranging governmental institutions. 3 45  More fundamentally,
the proposition is tied to the legitimacy of governing decisions. 346 For a
governmental actor's conduct to be legitimate, the conduct must pursue
the common interest, not the interest of the actor.3 47
The Constitution protects against self-serving action through sepa-
ration of powers, as modified by the idea of checks and balances. Legiti-
macy is maintained by providing officials in one branch the power to
check actions of coordinate branches.34 The independent counsel pro-
visions of the Ethics Act further these values. The Act is best seen as a
device to check unlawful exercises of power by executive officials by
holding them accountable to officials largely insulated from executive
control.349
From this perspective, it is acceptable that the Act removes a mea-
sure of executive power from presidential control, not because the presi-
dency can survive without it, but because the system of checks and
balances requires that the boundaries between the branches be broken if
necessary to maintain a balance among them. As with the Framers' deci-
sion to merge the theory of separated powers with checks and balances,
the Act's incursion on separation is designed to preserve separation of
powers, and with it the legitimacy and accountability of the
343. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
344. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Banks, supra, note 15, at 635; THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.).
345. Gwyn, supra note 250, at 67. Madison claimed that self-interest "would certainly bias
[one's] judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt [one's] integrity." THE FEDERALIST No. 10,
at 56 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed.).
346. See G. WILLS, supra note 251, at 114.
347. See Gwyn, supra note 250, at 67; Sunstein, supra note 268, at 434.
348. See Carter, supra note 208, at 766, 778-79; Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of the
Intentions of the Founding Fathers, With Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine of Separation of
Powers, 27 ARK. L. REV. 583, 599 (1973).
349. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 518, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
government.350
Much the same kind of case can be made for the Olson Court's
adoption of the demiformalist principle of Chadha-the rule that Con-
gress cannot assume a formal role in the administration of statutes it has
enacted.351  The Court embraced the demiformalist reading of Bowsher
and Chadha, rejecting the archformalist implications of those decisions
without normative justification,352 even though the normative principles
that underlie separation theory support the demiformalist injunction
against a formal legislative role in administration.
The decision in mid-seventeenth-century England to limit the execu-
tive to administration of the law, while prohibiting the legislature from
governing pursuant to the laws it enacted, marked the beginning of the
development of separation theory.353 This division and the disallowance
of legislative administration provide the central support of separation
theory's normative claim. To understand why this is so, one must appre-
ciate the "essential connection" 354 between separation of powers and the
rule of law. 355 Separation between lawmaking and law-administering
serves the rule of law by ensuring that those who create the laws are
bound by them.356  Separation reduces the potential for self-serving gov-
ernment action.357 The division between lawmaking and law-administer-
ing also helps secure the legitimacy of government: "Citizens will not
fear government if the executive who uses power uses only what is given
350. For accounts of the way in which separation of powers was designed to achieve legiti-
macy and accountability of government, see W.B. GWYN, supra note 254, at 16-17, 35-36, 40-
43; G. WILLS, supra note 251, at 113-16. The Supreme Court in Olson did not ignore the
conflict-of-interest rationale for the independent counsel process, but neither did the Court
offer conflict of interest as a normative justification for its separation-of-powers analysis. The
Court treated the rationale as a reasonable congressional purpose to which it was willing to
defer. See Olson, 108 S. Ct at 2611, 2619-20.
351. See supra text following note 74.
352. See Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2616-20.
353. See MJ.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 43-44.
354. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 255, at 21.
355. As used here, the "rule of law" refers to the principle of American constitutionalism
holding that the government governs by law and is governed by law. See, e.g., H.S. COM-
MAGER, supra note 276, at 227; D. EPSTEIN, supra note 300, at 128; F. MCDONALD, supra
note 225, at 260; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("A govern-
ment of laws, and not of men"). For useful discussions of the rule of law, see J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1971); J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210-29 (1979).
356. See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 300, at 129; Sunstein, supra note 268, at 434. As Profes-
sor Gwyn explains the theory: "If those who execute the laws also make them, they are in
effect unbound by them.... ." Gwyn, supra note 250, at 68; see W. B. GWYN, supra note 254,
at 35.
1 357. See Gwyn, supra note 250, at 68.
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.... and if the legislature can give power but not use it itself." '358 Main-
taining a firm bar against Congress' administration of the laws it creates,
as required by the demiformalist principle, serves the core values that
provide the basis for the constitutional distribution of powers.
The Court's hesitancy in Olson to offer a normative account of its
holding follows, perhaps, from its rejection of archformalism. The
archformalist rhetoric of the Court in Chadha and Bowsher, and of Judge
Silberman and Justice Scalia in Olson, was deeply theoretical. The error
of archformalism lies not in its linkage to theory, but in its adoption of an
erroneous theory. Archformalism flows from a grand theory of separa-
tion of powers that finds no support in the constitutional text.3 5 9 It ig-
nores the Framers' theoretical breakthrough, which combined separation
theory with checks and balances. 360 Finally, archformalism fails because
it prescribes a governing structure wholly incompatible with the de-
mands of modern government.36' The lesson from the failure of the
Court's experiment with archformalism is not the irrelevance of theory,
however, but the risks associated with an unflinching adherence to ill-
conceived grand theory.362
The healthy caution resulting from the archformalism experience
should not obscure the need for the Justices to provide a normative justi-
fication for their respective rulings. For the Court to ignore that duty
results in empty utilitarianism.
An eclectic approach to separation problems begins with a searching
analysis of text, history, and precedent. In difficult cases, these materials
may not provide a final answer. Rather, one begins the excavation of
constitutional values at stake in the dispute. As the analysis moves to a
functional assessment of the government practices at issue, the normative
concerns derived from the formal legal materials temper utilitarian con-
siderations. Pragamatism is bound in two respects. At the outset, the
analysis of text, history, and precedent frames the inquiry, identifying the
values against which any practical accommodation of powers must be
measured. In addition, this normative analysis provides a means of en-
suring that the ultimate resolution of the dispute serves the values associ-
ated with separation theory. A normative dimension is necessary to
358. D. EPSTEIN, supra note 300, at 129-30. Moreover, as Professor Sunstein has noted,
the legislative-executive distinction "promotes generality in lawmaking-a fundamental con-
stitutional value." Sunstein, supra note 268, at 434.
359. See supra notes 223-225 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 318-323 and accompanying text.
361. This charge was a prominent theme in Justice White's pointed dissents in Chadha, 462
U.S. at 967, and in Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759.
362. See Farber, supra note 215, at 1331-41.
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complete an eclectic approach to separation of powers because it securely
links the pragmatic accommodations of power relations necessary for re-
alistic resolutions of interbranch disputes to constitutional principle.
VI. Conclusion
The Court's decision in Olson signals a healthy departure from the
Court's recent vacillation between formalist and functional approaches to
separation problems by combining the two strategies into one integrated
methodology. As a matter of constitutional interpretation, Olson's adop-
tion of an eclectic approach signals a return to normalcy for the separa-
tion of powers. In addition, a methodology that joins formalist and
functional strategies is true to the historical forces that shaped the Fram-
ers' decision to merge the political theory of separated powers with
checks and balances. As the Court moves beyond Olson, the Justices
must offer a more normative dimension to their eclectic approach to sep-
aration problems. A normative analysis does not foreclose debate on the
meaning of separation of powers, nor does it guarantee objectively cor-
rect outcomes in separation disputes. The virtue of normative analysis is
that it channels disagreement and focuses debate on the values we expect
the structural arrangements of government to serve. By flushing consti-
tutional values into the open, and by tying the Court's judgment to those
values, adjudication becomes both flexible and principled. An eclectic
approach that incorporates normative judgments would go far toward
bringing separation of powers to a more satisfactory level of constitu-
tional discourse.

